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Abstract
This study extends the current literature on egotistic and philanthropic leadership
by considering the role of social cognition in explaining self-serving versus collectiveserving leadership behaviors. Specifically, this study proposed that the overt traits and
behaviors that constitute egotistic and philanthropic leadership are surface manifestations
of the justification mechanisms (JMs) stemming from uninhibited and inhibited power
motives. Thus, the purpose of this study was to identify the JMs that egotistic leaders rely
on to enhance the rational appeal of self-serving influence behaviors and the JMs that
philanthropic leaders rely on to enhance the rational appeal of collective-serving
influence behaviors. Additionally, this study aimed to develop and validate a conditional
reasoning test designed to measure these JMs. It was hypothesized that the extent to
which individuals’ rely on egotistic justifications mechanisms to rationalize behavior
would be positively related to the extent to which they use hard influence tactics and
manipulative influence tactics. Furthermore, it was also hypothesized that the extent to
which individuals’ use philanthropic justifications mechanisms to rationalize behavior
would be positively related to the extent to which they use soft influence tactics and
rational persuasion to influence others. Preliminary support was found for the relationship
between the egotistic JMs and self-serving influence behaviors and for the relationship
between the philanthropic JMs and collective-serving influence behaviors. Thus, the
initial validity evidence for using the conditional reasoning methodology in the prediction
of egotistic and philanthropic leadership behaviors was promising.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One of the most serious threats to society today is a lack of moral leadership
(Mitchell, 1993). Over the past few years, the American public has been witness to a
myriad of leadership abuses including fraudulent accounting practices, extravagant
corporate spendings, and misappropriation of assets. While such behaviors serve the selfinterests of leaders, they often have devastating consequences for employees,
organizations, and society. Given the threat that these self-serving or egotistic leaders
pose to society, researchers have devoted a considerable amount of attention in recent
years to understanding the nature of such leaders. However, while scholars have engaged
in much speculation concerning the personality differences between egotistic leaders and
collective serving or philanthropic leaders (see Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), few have
empirically investigated these proposed differences. Consequently, there are no
established methods or measures for identifying individuals who are likely to engage in
egotistic leadership behaviors as opposed to philanthropic leadership behaviors before
they are given the power to act.
Furthermore, despite all of the theoretical discussions concerning the relationship
between personality and these two forms of leadership, it seems that scholars have just
begun to scratch the surface in understanding the role that personality plays in
influencing a leader’s propensity to behave in an ethical or unethical manner. More
specifically, researchers have tended to focus on motives and global traits when
discussing possible predictors of egotistic and philanthropic leadership behaviors, but
have by in large neglected social cognitions. Social cognitions may be important to the
1

Table 1.1: Select Terminology and Personality Variables Associated with Egotistic
Leadership.
Authors

Term

Motives

Traits

Conger, 1990;
Conger &
Kanungo, 1998;
Kanungo &
Mendonca,
1996;

Negative
Charismatic
Leadership

Egotistic intent
Affiliative assurance
Personal power
Personal achievement

Self-aggrandizement
Narcissism

Howell, 1988;
House &
Howell, 1992;

Personalized
Charismatic
Leadership

Personalized power
(high need for power
and low activity
inhibition)

Self-aggrandizing
Non-egalitarian
Exploitive
Machiavellianism
Narcissism
Authoritarianism

O’Connor,
Mumford,
Clifton,
Gessner, &
Connelly, 1995

Personalized
Charismatic
Leadership

Personalized power

Narcissism

Bass &
Steidlmeier,
1999

PseudoTransformational
Leadership

Egotistic
Narcissistic
Intolerant

Howell &
Avolio, 1992

Unethical
Charismatic
Leadership

Close-minded

Yukl, 2002

Unethical
Leadership

Personalized power

2

Low emotional
maturity

Table 1.2: Select Terminology and Personality Variables Associated with Philanthropic
Leadership.

Authors
Conger, 1990;
Conger &
Kanungo, 1998;
Kanungo &
Mendonca,
1996;

Term
Positive
Charismatic
Leadership

Motives
Altruistic intent
Affiliative interest
Institutional power
Social achievement

Traits
Self-discipline/
Self-development

Howell, 1988;
House &
Howell, 1992;

Socialized
Charismatic
Leadership

Socialized power (high
need for power and high
activity inhibition)

Bass &
Steidlmeier,
1999

Authentic
Transformational
Leadership

Collectively
oriented
Egalitarian
Nonexploitive
Altruistic
Responsible

Howell &
Avolio, 1992

Ethical
Charismatic
Leadership

Collins, 2001

Level 5
Leadership

Greenleaf, 1977

Servant
Leadership

Yukl, 2002

Ethical
Leadership

Open-minded
Integrity
Honest
Respectful
Socialized power
Modest/humble
(ambition for the company Calm
determination
not for themselves)
Socially
responsible
Nurturing
Empathetic
Socialized power

3

Personal integrity
High emotional
maturity

study of egotistic and philanthropic leadership because they facilitate the expression of
motives (Cervone, 1991; James & Mazerolle, 2002). In particular, James and Mazerolle
(2002) argued that motives are indirectly related to individuals’ tendencies to behave in a
relatively consistent manner across situations through their influence on social cognition.
That is, it is presumed that overt or observable behaviors are surface manifestations of
cognitive processes and cognitive structures that have been shaped by motives. Thus,
given that social cognitions have been essentially absent from the literature on egotistic
and philanthropic leadership, far richer discussions are needed in order to fully
understand as well as predict the two groups of leaders. Specifically, researchers need to
consider how certain aspects of social cognition (e.g., implicit biases, framing
proclivities, attributions) contribute to a leader’s tendency to engage in unethical or
ethical leadership behaviors.
Therefore, a major goal of the present study was to expand the current literature
on egotistic and philanthropic leadership by considering the role of social cognition in
explaining unethical versus ethical leadership behaviors. Specifically, the purpose of this
study was to identify the justification mechanisms (JMs) that egotistic leaders rely on to
enhance the rational appeal of self-serving influence behaviors and the JMs that
philanthropic leaders rely on to enhance the rational appeal of collective-serving
influence behaviors. Additionally, this study aimed to develop and test an instrument
designed to measure these JMs. As previously mentioned, there is no established measure
for identifying these types of leaders. Thus, this study not only provides a more
sophisticated explanation for egotistic and philanthropic leadership, but also attempts to
offer preliminary support for a measure developed to predict these two groups of leaders.
4

CHAPTER II
PRESENT STUDY
Leadership is the process of influencing others and facilitating efforts to achieve a
shared goal (Yukl, 2002). Given that influence is the essence of all leadership (Yukl,
2002) and all leaders have the ability to impact others, how and why leaders choose to
influence their followers and their surrounding environments is essentially what
distinguishes the “ethical” leaders from the “unethical” leaders. More specifically, leaders
who influence others to advance their own self-interests are typically viewed as behaving
unethically, and leaders who influence others to serve collective interests despite their
own personal interests are typically viewed as acting in an ethical manner (Conger &
Kanungo, 1998; Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996). According to Conger and Kanungo
(1998) “the self-serving goals and activities of the negative charismatic leaders are
questionable on ethical grounds, whereas the altruistic goals and behaviors of positive
charismatic leaders are considered morally desirable” (p. 213). Although researchers have
used a number of terms to label these two faces of leadership especially as they relate to
charismatic leadership (see Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), they have basically described the
same two leadership orientations. For the purposes of this paper, these two forms of
leadership will be referred to as “Egotistic Leadership” and “Philanthropic Leadership”.
Egotistic leadership is the process of abusing one’s influence over others for
personal gains. In general, egotistic leaders use power to dominate and defeat others.
They are narcissistic, authoritarian, tyrannical, and self-aggrandizing (Conger, 1990;
Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996; House & Howell, 1992).
Furthermore, they exploit and manipulate others (House & Howell, 1992; McClelland,
5

1975). They articulate goals based on their own personal motives and emphasize follower
dependence and conformity (Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Howell, 1988). Egotistic leaders
also frequently withhold information from subordinates (Howell, 1988), and show
disregard for the needs and feelings of others (House & Howell, 1992). Additionally, they
treat their followers as tools who provide them with the needed knowledge, skills,
abilities, and effort to accomplish their goals (Conger & Kanungo, 1998).
Egotistic leaders who engage in charismatic or transformational leadership (i.e.,
an exceptionally influential form of leadership in which leaders transform the needs and
aspirations of followers from self-interests to collective interests; Conger & Kanungo,
1988; House & Howell, 1992) are particularly dangerous because they are capable of
manipulating followers to go beyond their self-interests and emotionally engage in
pursuits of evil ends contrary to the followers’ best interests (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999;
Stevens, D’Intino, & Victor, 1995; White & Wooten, 1986). According to Bass and
Steidlmeier (1999), these pseudo-transformational leaders give the impression that they
are concerned about the collective unit, but privately they are concerned about the good
they can achieve for themselves. Furthermore, they inspire others by focusing on the
worst in people (e.g., conspiracies, insecurities, fears, unreal dangers, demonic plots).
They feed off of the ignorance of their followers so that their followers will accept more
ambiguities and inconsistencies, and they substitute emotional argumentation for rational
discourse. They also exploit the feelings of their followers to maintain admiration and
idolization from them (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Sankowsky, 1995). All in all, egotistic
charismatic leaders are unethical because their influence tactics are grounded in
manipulation and exploitation.
6

Conversely, philanthropic leadership is the process of influencing others for the
benefit of serving and advancing the collective unit. Philanthropic leadership is based on
egalitarian behaviors and a focus on the development and motivation of others (Conger &
Kanungo, 1998; House & Howell, 1992; Howell, 1998). Philanthropic leaders tend to be
humble (Collins, 2001), emotionally mature (Yukl, 2002), and altruistic in nature
(Conger & Kanungo, 1998). These leaders formulate and articulate goals that originate
from their followers’ wants and needs (Howell, 1988). They also mobilize their
followers’ potential and encourage followers to think on their own and to challenge the
status quo (Howell, 1988). Furthermore, philanthropic leaders utilize empowering
strategies to influence followers, and they guide others toward goals that benefit the
organization and all of its members (Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Howell, 1988).
In contrast to pseudo-transformational leaders (i.e., egotistic leaders who engage
in charismatic/transformational behaviors), philanthropic leaders who engage in
charismatic/transformational behaviors are truly transformational because they are
morally uplifting (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Burns, 1978). Such leaders inspire others by
focusing on the good in people. They persuade others by engaging in rational discourse
rather than emotional argumentation, and they intellectually stimulate their followers by
building up their followers’ sense of confidence (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). Hence,
philanthropic leadership is the ideal ethical form of leadership because it is grounded in
values and based on trust.
In sum, egotistic leaders and philanthropic leaders generally influence others in
very different ways. That is, egotistic leaders exercise power by dominating followers
and keeping followers weak, and philanthropic leaders exercise power by empowering
7

followers and serving the needs of their constituents. Additionally, while both egotistic
and philanthropic leaders engage in charismatic/transformational leadership behaviors,
they engage in different subsets of these behaviors (i.e., idealized influence, intellectual
stimulation, inspirational motivation, and individual consideration). For instance,
egotistic leaders inspire others by focusing on the worst in people and philanthropic
leaders inspire others by focusing on the best in people. Thus, although egotistic and
philanthropic charismatic leaders may be extremely skilled at influencing others, their
interactions with followers are quite different (see Table 2.1).
The Empirical Foundations of Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership
As previously mentioned, most of the current literature on egotistic and
philanthropic leadership is theoretical in nature; however, much of the speculation
concerning these two forms of leadership stems from empirical work on personalized and
socialized power orientations (McClelland 1970; 1975). According to McClelland
(1975), personalized power is an “unsocialized concern for personal dominance” (p. 167).
Individuals with a personalized power orientation essentially have a strong motive for
power and a low motive for activity inhibition, which McClelland (1975) defined as selfcontrol. Because they have little inhibition, these individuals exercise power impulsively
to satisfy their strong need for esteem and status. Research suggests that individuals with
personalized power orientations use primitive strategies to dominate others (e.g.,
authoritarian insistence that their goals are right despite what their followers may think;
McClelland, 1975). In addition, they treat other people as pawns and are not interested in
the welfare of others.
On the other hand, socialized power is, as the name suggests, a more socialized
8

Table 2.1: Typical Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership Behaviors.

Transformational/
Charismatic
Behaviors

Egotistic Leadership
Orientation

Philanthropic Leadership
Orientation

Highlights “we-they” differences
in values (i.e., we have good
values, they have bad values).

Promotes universal brotherhood
values.

Promotes grandiose and flawed
visions that reflect the internal
needs of the leader.
Inspirational appeals focus on the
worst in people.

Promotes realistic visions that
reflect the needs of the
organization and employees.
Inspirational appeals focus on the
best in people.
Focuses on empowerment.

Attempts to sell a personal vision
as the only way for the
organization to succeed.

Intellectually stimulates others by
providing factual information.

Motivates others by controlling
them.

Provides coaching, mentoring, and
growth opportunities.

Intellectually stimulate others by
substituting anecdotes for hard
evidence.
Individualized consideration of
few; fosters favoritism and
competition among followers.
Maintains a parent-child
relationship with followers.
Communication
Style

One-way communication

Two-way communication.

Restrict negative information and
maximize positive information.

Shares both positive and negative
important information.

Creates an illusion of control by
attributing negative outcomes to
external causes.

Considers and learns from
criticism.

Deliberately ignores people and
excludes them from taking an
active part in discussions.

Stimulates followers to think
independently and to question the
leader’s view.

Note: The behaviors mentioned above are based on work by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999),
Howell and Avolio (1992), Wright and Smye (1996), and Yukl (2002).
9

Table 2.1: continued.

Communication
Style

Egotistic Leadership
Orientation
Ignores or reacts in a defensive
manner to criticism.

Philanthropic Leadership
Orientation

Censures critical or opposing
views.
Demands own decisions be
accepted without question.
General
management style

Insensitive to followers’ needs.
Displays uncontrolled anger,
often shouting and using vulgar
language.

Acts in a way that is consistent
with espoused values.
Is willing to take personal risks and
actions to accomplish the mission
or achieve the vision.

Humiliates others in front of
colleagues or in private.

Shares recognition with others.

Persistently criticizes and uses
sarcasm.

Focuses on the development of
successors.

Sets impossible deadlines and
changes instructions without
consultation.

Offer contingent rewards and
punishments.

Has difficulty delegating because
of a belief that no one else can do
the job to the required standard.

Work through legitimate
established channels and systems
of authority.
Maintains control over emotions.

Takes credit for other people’s
ideas and success but never
shoulders the blame when things
go wrong.
Continually undermines others’
authority.
Failure to develop successors of
equal ability.
Assessment of the environment
is unrealistic or distorted.

Note: The behaviors mentioned above are based on work by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999),
Howell and Avolio (1992), Wright and Smye (1996), and Yukl (2002).
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form of power in which individuals are concerned with interpersonal influence
(McClelland, 1970; 1975). In essence, socialized power is a strong need for power
constrained by a high need for activity inhibition. While personalized power is based on a
strong need for esteem and status, socialized power is based on a strong need for positive
social influence. According to McClelland (1970), “At the fantasy level it expresses itself
in thoughts of exercising power for the benefit of others and by feelings of great
ambivalence about holding power…” (p. 36). Furthermore, McClelland, Davis, Kalin,
and Wanner (1972) summarized the findings of a study which suggested that individuals
with a socialized power orientation tend to be altruistic, to work through legitimate
channels of authority, and are self-controlled. These individuals also seek office for the
sake of serving others and are concerned about the negative consequences that may result
in their own use of power (McClelland, 1970).
Despite the empirical support for personalized and socialized power, which also
lends support for egotistic and philanthropic leadership, several areas of McClelland’s
research are of concern. First, most of McClelland’s research has utilized the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) as the primary measure of motives (e.g., power). The TAT is a
projective technique that consists of a series of pictures of people in ambiguous
situations. Participants are asked to make up a story about each picture. Then the
experimenter codes each story to obtain a measure of the participant’s motives. However,
the interrater reliabilities and construct validity of the system designed to score the TAT
are of concern to many psychometricians (Aiken, 1994; Anastasi, 1982; Cohen, Swerdlik,
& Phillips, 1996; Worchel & Dupree, 1990). More specifically, the unstandardized
procedures for administration, scoring, and interpreting the TAT have lead many
11

psychometricians to view the measure as psychometrically unsound. Furthermore, several
psychometricians have argued that the validity of the interpretation of the data from the
TAT is based more on the scorer’s skills than on the psychometric properties of the test
(Worchel & Dupree, 1990).
Second, the one factor that distinguishes personalized power from socialized
power appears to lack conceptual and theoretical development (Winter, 1991). That is,
following McClelland’s research (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982) leaders with a
personalized power orientation have a moderate to high power motive and low activity
inhibition. Similarly, leaders with a socialized power orientation also have a moderate to
high power motive, but score high on activity inhibition. Thus, the only difference
between personalized and socialized power is activity inhibition; however, it is not clear
what activity inhibition is measuring. More specifically, the measure of activity
inhibition was developed empirically during a study on alcohol consumption in which the
authors found that men’s expression of power in TAT stories varied depending on how
frequently they used the word “not” in their stories (McClelland, Davis, Kalin, &
Wanner, 1972). Those who used the word “not” with a high degree of frequency were
considered high in activity inhibition and those who used the word “not” with a low
degree of frequency were considered low in activity inhibition. According to Winter
(1991), “…there is little independent evidence or theoretical justification for suggesting
that activity inhibition—defined as the frequency of use of the word “not”—is a measure
of “self-control”, as assumed by McClelland and Boyatzis…” (p.71). Thus, while
research suggests that activity inhibition moderates the expression of power and has
predictive validity, it is of questionable conceptual status. In other words, this suggests
12

that in terms of what is being measured the distinction between personalized and
socialized power is unclear.
The Missing Link between Motives and Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership
Despite the confusion and controversy surrounding activity inhibition,
McClelland and his colleagues’ empirical work is beneficial in that it was one of the first
to provide researchers with some insight into the motives that contribute to different sets
of leadership behaviors. In particular, they argued that while the power motive is
important in explaining why individuals attempt to influence others, how the power
motive is expressed is dependant on the existence of an inhibitory motive. More
specifically, when a strong power motive is uninhibited, individuals tend to have power
thoughts focused on personal dominance or winning at someone else’s expense, and they
exercise power impulsively to satisfy their strong need to aggressively dominate others
and their strong need for esteem. Research suggests that individuals with a strong power
motive are less cooperative, more deceitful, evaluate others more negatively, have more
arguments, and are more impulsively aggressive than individuals with a weaker power
motive (McClelland, 1984; Terhune, 1968). Moreover, these individuals tend to describe
their role in friendships in terms of opportunities to be dominant and controlling
(McAdams, Healy, & Krause, 1982), and they frequently call attention to themselves
(Winter, 1973).
Conversely, when a strong power motive is inhibited, individuals tend to have
power thoughts that focus on doing good for others or for some worthy cause
(McClelland et al., 1972). While McClelland argued that this inhibiting motive was selfcontrol, Winter and Barenbaum (1985), suggested that this regulating motive is
13

responsibility. The authors found that responsibility (as measured by the presence or
absence of moral or legal standards, feelings of obligation, concern for others, concern
about consequences, and self-judgments in TAT responses) moderated the expression of
power into either philanthropic (i.e., high responsible power) or egotistic (i.e., low
responsible power) channels. Hence, this inhibiting motive appears to stem from a strong
sense of responsibility for others or in Murray’s (1938) terms, a strong need for
nurturance.
Uninhibited and inhibited power motives are important to the study of egotistic
and philanthropic leadership because they indirectly influence behaviors. More
specifically, James and Mazerolle (2002) argued that motives indirectly impact
behavioral tendencies through their effects on social cognition. Formally defined, social
cognition is the “cognitive processes and structures…through which individuals assign
personal meaning to events, plan courses of action, and regulate their motivation,
emotion, and interpersonal behavior” (Cervone, 1991; p. 372). Simply stated, social
cognitions shape behavior. Thus, to fully understand why some individuals seek and
abuse power to serve personal interests and other individuals seek and use power to
advance collective interests researchers must turn their attention to the underlying social
cognitions that link relevant motives (i.e., uninhibited power and inhibited power) to the
behavioral tendencies that predict specific leadership behaviors.
A Conditional Reasoning Approach to Egotistic and Philanthropic Leadership
According to James and Mazerolle (2002) motives impact the inferences,
judgments, explanations, and theories that people hold about the causes and effects of
their own behavior and the behavior of others. Such reasoning that is dependent on the
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motives of the reasoners is referred to as “conditional reasoning” (James & McIntyre,
2000; James & Mazerolle, 2002). Specifically, James and Mazerolle (2002) proposed that
“conditional reasoning occurs because the interpretations and analyses of events used to
furnish logical support to a given type of behavior are unconsciously shaped, defined, and
guided by the motives, framing proclivities, and implicit assumptions of individual
reasoners” (p. 17). Simply stated, conditional reasoning occurs because an individual’s
underlying motives provide a set of assumptions that make a behavior appear rational for
a given situation (James and Mazerolle, 2002). Furthermore, two individuals with
different motives are likely to frame the same events differently and unconsciously rely
on these different motives to build rational cases for their contrasting behaviors. For
instance, egotistic leaders are likely to frame abusive leadership behaviors in a positive
manner because they rely on an uninhibited power motive and philanthropic leaders are
likely to frame abusive leadership behaviors as irrational because they rely on an
inhibited power motive. Even though both groups of leaders hold different judgments
about what constitutes reasonable behavior, both groups believe that their framing
proclivities are sensible and rational as opposed to foolish and irrational.
James (1998) referred to the types of unconscious biases that shape framing
proclivities (i.e., reasoning) as Justification Mechanisms (JMs). The use of JMs allows
individuals to use what they believe to be logical reasoning to reach conclusions on what
would be acceptable behavior that are consistent with their underlying motives. By
identifying the JMs used by egotistic leaders and the JMs used by philanthropic leaders, it
is possible to examine why these two groups of leaders differ in their behaviors on a more
sophisticated level. Specifically, this study proposes that the overt behaviors that
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constitute these two forms of leadership are surface manifestations of the JMs that stem
from uninhibited and inhibited power motives. Furthermore, by identifying relevant JMs,
a conditional reasoning test used to measure individuals’ proclivities to engage these JMs
in reasoning can be developed. The development of such a test is important because it
stands to improve researchers’ ability to identify individuals who are likely to abuse
power as well as those who are likely to wield power to benefit the greater good.
More specifically, a conditional reasoning (CR) measurement system is an
indirect system for measuring individuals’ implicit biases through objective problem
solving. Respondents are asked to solve inductive reasoning problems that appear to
measure critical thinking skills, but what is actually being assessed are their justification
mechanisms (James & Mazerolle, 2002). CR measurement systems are possible because
individuals tend to engage in the use of implicit reasoning biases to enhance the rational
appeal of the expression of their motives, and to logically discount reasoning that
supports the expression of motives incompatible with their own (cf. Fiske & Taylor,
1991; James, 1998; Westen, 1991). A high score on a CR test indicates that the
respondent has frequently selected alternatives that are based on the JMs that enhance the
rational appeal of the behavior of interest. Such a propensity to select the JM alternatives
as opposed to the conventional alternatives suggests that the respondent is implicitly
ready and willing to engage in the behavior (James, 1998). While CR measures have not
been applied to leadership, the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression routinely
produces validities against salient behavioral criteria that surpass the .30 barrier (James &
McIntyre, 2000). These findings are applicable to the study of leadership because
McClelland (1975) found that individuals with personalized power orientations
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frequently engage in aggressive behaviors.
A CR test stands to enhance the prediction of unethical and highly ethical leaders
because 1) CR measures are less subject to the socially desirable responses that selfreport measures are susceptible to and 2) CR measures offer a means of assessing
unconscious facets of personality. More specifically, while self-report measures are
frequently used by leadership researchers to measure personality, they are somewhat
concerning because many individuals consciously or unconsciously answer items in
socially desirable ways (i.e., they answer items in ways that will make them appear
favorable to others; James & Mazerolle, 2002). According to a number of researchers,
socially desirable responding decreases the accuracy (Hough & Schneider, 1996; Kluger,
Reilly, & Russell, 1991; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, &
Levin, 1998) and the validity of self-report tests (Kluger et al., 1991; Rosse et al, 1998).
Given that egotistic leaders typically mask their true intentions to followers (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999), it is possible they will respond to self-report items in a socially
desirable fashion.
Another concern regarding self-report inventories is that they are not capable of
measuring unconscious facets of personality. While individuals are able to reflect on and
respond to self-report items about their behavioral tendencies, intentions, and reasons for
action based on their conscious perceptions (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger,
1989), they are not able to accurately report about their unconscious motives and biases.
According to James and Mazerolle (2002),“self-report measures tend to be most effective
in predicting short-term behavioral adjustments that require extensive cost-benefit
analyses and comparisons of alternative models of behavior” (p. 132), but they tend to be
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less effective in predicting long-term behavioral trends or reactions to novel/evocative
stimuli. McClelland et al. (1989) argued that long-term behavioral trends or reactions to
novel/evocative stimuli are typically the result of implicit motives that can only be
assessed through indirect measures. Consequently, McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and
Lowell (1976) have recommended the use of projective measures, in particular the TAT,
to assess implicit personality variables like motives. Nonetheless, as previously
mentioned the TAT is viewed by some as psychometrically unsound. Thus, given the
concerns surrounding self-report inventories and projective tests like the TAT, a CR
measure of egotistic and philanthropic leadership orientations stands to be a valuable tool
in the prediction of unethical and ethical influence behaviors.
Justification Mechanisms Used by Egotistic Leaders
As previously mentioned, conditional reasoning measurement systems are based
on the premise that individuals behave differently in part, because they have different
underlying justification mechanisms to rationalize their behaviors. Given that egotistic
and philanthropic leaders engage in different leadership behaviors, it is assumed that they
rely on different sets of implicit biases to justify their behaviors. That is, it is assumed
that egotistic leaders rely on JMs that make behaviors such as humiliating employees in
front of others, receiving excessive salaries, bonuses and company perks, and pursuing
their own interests over collective interests appear rational and sensible. It is also
assumed that philanthropic leaders rely on a different set of JMs that make behaviors
such as extensive focus on employee development, taking large personal risks in pursuit
of shared goals, and serving the needs of the collective unit despite personal needs appear
rational and sensible. While the literature does not explicitly state how these two groups
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of leaders differ in terms of their implicit reasoning biases, there is some evidence to
suggest that egotistic and philanthropic leaders rely on different JMs.
More specifically, in reviewing the personality variables that have been linked to
egotistic leadership (e.g., narcissism, Machiavellianism, authoritarianism, aggression, and
personalized power) it appears that egotistic leaders rationalize abusive leadership
behaviors using a Potency bias. A Potency bias is the tendency to frame and reason using
the contrast of strong versus weak or winning versus losing (James & Mazerolle, 2002).
Furthermore, it is the tendency to see life as a competitive game in which others exist on
a continuum ranging from strong, powerful, or brave to weak, submissive, or cowardly.
This bias may permeate the egotistic leader’s unconsciousness such that he or she views
others in terms of winners and losers (e.g., leaders are winners, followers are losers).
Similarly, egotistic leaders also appear to rationalize abusive leadership behaviors
using a Hostile Attribution Bias. This bias is the tendency to see malevolent intent in the
actions of others (James & Mazerolle, 2002). It is also the view that everyone is out to
win. With this bias in place, individuals may frame the benign acts of colleagues as
having a hidden agenda designed to win at the egotistic leader’s expense (e.g., an
egotistic leader may interpret a colleague’s openness at group meetings as trying to look
favorable in the eyes of the supervisor to win a promotion at the egotistic leader’s
expense).
Both the Potency bias and the Hostile Attribution bias appear to be shaped by an
uninhibited power motive and underlie narcissistic behaviors. In particular, McClelland
(1970; 1975) proposed that individuals with personalized power tend to behave as if life
is a Zero-Sum game: If I win, you lose. Furthermore, in their research on narcissism,
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Raskin, Novacek, and Hogan (1991) argued that narcissists have a Warrior defensive
style. They proposed that the warrior competes for glory (e.g., status, wealth, power,
fame, and adoration) and views others as their competitors. Similarly, James and
Mazerolle (2002) identified the Potency Bias and the Hostile Attribution bias as key JMs
used by individuals with a strong need to aggress. They maintained that “aggressive
individuals…tend to filter interactions as contests to establish dominance versus
submissiveness” (p. 13). Thus, individuals with a strong Potency bias tend to assume that
dominating others is a demonstration of strength and bravery that gains respect from
others. Additionally, individuals with a Hostile Attribution bias tend to assume that others
are out to get them and steal their leadership power.
A third bias that egotistic leaders appear to use to rationalize their behavior is
referred to as the Others as Objects bias or the Derogation of Target bias. This bias is a
tendency to frame others as objects or tools worthy of control. In particular, it involves a
proclivity to ignore or devalue the human characteristics (e.g., emotions, independent
thoughts, needs, wants) of the target as well as to ascribe a number of negative
characteristics (e.g., stupid, gullible, unattractive) to the target (James & Mazerolle,
2002). This bias may also be accompanied by an inclination to selectively attend to the
target’s knowledge, skills, and abilities while disregarding other aspects of the person.
The selective attention of egotistic leaders may reinforce their unconscious proclivities to
conclude that others are tools to be controlled and manipulated. Furthermore, with this
bias in place, an egotistic leader is likely to see the failure of others as a reason for
terminating their relationship (e.g., if the person/tool has a weakness or fails, the
person/tool is no longer needed and should be discarded).
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This bias is also a JM held by aggressive individuals (James & Mazerolle, 2002)
and is evident in research on personalized power and narcissism. According to
McClelland, individuals whose power drive is fixated at the personalized level tend to
treat people as pawns rather than origins. Conger and Kanungo (1998) also proposed that
negative charismatic leaders use their followers as tools for personal gains. Furthermore,
O’Connor, Mumford, Clifton, Gessner, and Connelly (1995) posited that personalized
leaders have object beliefs. Similarly, the DSM III (American Psychiatric Association,
1980, p.317) describes narcissistic individuals as lacking the ability to recognize how
others feel. Hence they tend to view others as objects (Dimaggio, Semerari, Falcone,
Nicolo, Carcione, & Procacci, 2002). Leaders with object beliefs will discount any
impact they will have on others when selecting a course of action (O’Connor et al.,
1995). Empirical evidence also suggests that individuals who tend to view others as tools
or objects to be used for personal gains are likely to abuse power. Specifically, Miller and
Eisenberg (1988) and Hunter, Gerbing, and Boster (1982) found that lack of empathy and
the belief that others could legitimately be manipulated were related to destructive
interpersonal behaviors.
A fourth implicit reasoning bias that serves to justify abusive leadership behaviors
is the Superiority Bias. The Superiority Bias is a tendency to frame oneself as superior to
others and to view no one as an equal within one’s domain. This is reflected in the
implicit belief that one has special qualities that make him or her unique. This bias is also
indicated by the tendency to frame the need for approval, social acceptance and advice
seeking as signs of inferiority. That is, individuals with a strong Superiority bias believe
that superior beings do not need others to like them as friends or do not to get advice or
21

approval from others before acting; rather superior beings deserve admiration, envy, and
adoration.
This bias is a major component of narcissism (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Research
on narcissism suggests that narcissists will resist advice or accepting suggestions from
others because it makes them appear inferior (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Furthermore,
because they see themselves as superior to others, they truly do not believe others have
anything useful to tell them or offer them and they are biased to take more credit for
accomplishments than is legitimate (Hogan et al., 1990). A qualitative study by Howell
and Avolio (1992) found that unethical leaders are closed-minded to input, feedback, and
suggestions from others. Moreover, they found that “Unethical charismatic leaders have
an inflated sense of self-importance, thriving on attention and admiration from others and
shunning contrary opinions” (p. 47).
Another implicit bias that appears to be influential in rationalizing the abuse of
power and has its roots in narcissism is the Meritocracy Bias. This bias is the tendency to
believe that talented or high-performing individuals are entitled to special privileges and
exemptions from normal social demands (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association,
1980). Specifically, individuals with a strong meritocracy bias view themselves as well as
other highly talented individuals as sovereign beings who do not belong to any one
group. Accordingly, they frame rules and norms as unfair restrictions on behavior that
should be broken if they deny entitled others from getting what they want.
As mentioned above, this bias is supported in the literature on narcissism.
Specifically, research on narcissism suggests that narcissists are characterized by a
feeling that they do not belong to a group, (Dimaggio, 2002). Furthermore, they have a
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lack of sensitivity and concern for social customs, and they believe that it is fully within
their rights to demand and take whatever they want (Dimaggio, 2002). Similarly, research
on unethical, egotistic leadership suggests that these leaders expect and demand that their
decisions be followed without question, (Howell & Avolio, 1992). Howell and Avolio
also found that these leaders only follow group standards if they satisfy their immediate
self-interests. Additionally, in their research on the rationalization strategies used by
employees who engaged in corrupt or fraudulent acts, Anand, Ashforth and Joshi (2005)
found that these unethical employees frequently reported a sense of entitlement when
justifying their behaviors.
Finally, it appears that egotistic leaders also rely on an Infinitely Manipulatable
Universe bias to rationalize self-serving leadership behaviors. This bias is the tendency to
frame the environment as malleable. With this bias in place, individuals tend to view
factors external to the self as trivial obstacles that can be easily overcome. That is,
individuals with a strong Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias tend to discount the
impact that situational constraints (e.g., lack of resources, marketplace trends, economic
conditions) will have on the outcome of events. These individuals have a proclivity to
believe that what was successful in one situation will be successful in all situations.
This bias is evident in research on unethical leadership and narcissism.
Specifically, Conger and Kanungo (1998) discussed several cases in which negative
charismatic leaders were so focused on achieving their grandiose visions or pursuing their
great ideas that they ignored the costs of their aims, miscalculated necessary resources,
disregarded market demands, and underestimated competitors. These leaders tended to
believe that they had found the formula for success and that they alone had special insight
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into the marketplace (Conger & Kanungo, 1998). Furthermore, literature on narcissism
suggests that narcissistic individuals distort reality to maintain their self-esteem
(Dimaggio et al., 2002). According to Kets de Vries and Miller (1985), a leader who is
extremely narcissistic “tends to do very little scanning or analysis of the internal and
external environment before making decisions…The environment is somehow “beneath
him,” it is assumed to pose no challenges that cannot be easily met” (p. 596).
In conclusion, egotistic leaders strive to win at all costs and see themselves as
superior, nonfallible beings entitled to all that the world has to offer. Moreover, they tend
to frame others as tools that they can control and manipulate to serve their own selfinterests. They use their perceptions that they are superior and others are inferior objects
to justify abusing power. They do not think of their abusive actions as irrational; rather,
they view them as the justifiable acts of superior individuals who are seeking what they
are entitled to show the world they are winners (see Table 2.2 for a description of
Egotistic JMs).
Justification Mechanisms Used by Philanthropic Leaders
In contrast to egotistic leaders, philanthropic leaders are not likely to believe that
abusive leadership behaviors are justifiable acts as they appear to rely on a different set of
implicit biases that stem from a strong inhibited power motive. Consequently,
philanthropic leaders often attempt to enhance the rational appeal of forgoing their own
self-interests to serve the interests of others. In reviewing the personality variables that
have been associated with philanthropic leadership (postconventional/high moral
reasoning, socialized power, emotional maturity, benevolence) one bias that these leaders
appear to rely on to enhance the appeal of highly ethical behaviors is the Social Contract
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Table 2.2: Illustrative Justification Mechanisms for Egotistic Leadership Orientation.
Justification
Mechanism
Potency Bias

Definition
A tendency to frame and reason using the contrast of strong
versus weak or winning versus losing (James & Mazerolle,
2002). Also a tendency to see life as a competitive game in
which others exist on a continuum ranging from strong,
powerful, or brave to weak, submissive, or cowardly.

Hostile Attribution
Bias

A tendency see malevolent intent in the actions of others
(James & Mazerolle, 2002). Also the view that everyone is out
to win. With this bias in place, individuals may frame the
benign acts of colleagues as having a hidden agenda designed
to win at the egotistic leader’s expense.

Others as Objects
Bias

A tendency to frame others as objects or tools worthy of
control. In particular, it involves a proclivity to ignore or
devalue the human characteristics (e.g., emotions, independent
thoughts, needs, wants) of the target while selectively attending
to the target’s knowledge, skills, and abilities (James &
Mazerolle, 2002).

Superiority Bias

A tendency to frame oneself as superior to others and to view
no one as an equal within one’s domain. Reflected in an
implicit bias that one has special qualities that make him or her
unique. Also indicated by a tendency to frame the need for
approval, social acceptance or advice seeking as signs of
inferiority, and admiration, envy, and adoration from others as
signs of superiority.

Meritocracy Bias

A tendency to believe that the world owes talented individuals
special privileges and exemptions from normal social demands.
Includes a tendency to view talented others as sovereign beings
who do not belong to any one group. Also indicated by a
proclivity to selectively attend to norms, rules and customs that
serve personal interests, but ignore all other norms, rules, and
customs.

Infinitely
Manipulatable
Universe

A tendency to frame the environment as malleable. Includes a
tendency to discount the impact that situational constraints
(e.g., lack of resources, marketplace trends, economic
conditions) will have on the outcome of events.
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Bias. This bias is the tendency to frame society as a contractual commitment that
individuals with diverse values and opinions freely enter into in order to preserve the
rights and promote the welfare of all individuals. This bias is a proclivity to frame “what
is right” as the preservation and protection of universal human rights for all (e.g., life,
free will, freedom of speech) and “what is wrong” as the denial of these universal human
rights. With this bias in place, philanthropic individuals tend to view norms, laws, and
rules as a form of social cooperation and agreement that all members are obligated to
uphold for the welfare of society unless they violate basic human rights. People with a
strong social contract bias tend to view all others as equals.
This line of reasoning is consistent with Kohlberg’s (cf. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987)
postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Postconventionalists tend to frame society as
a contract based on social cooperation and agreement (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
According to Colby and Kohlberg (1987), “The importance of upholding contracts is
seen as deriving from the fact that persons warrant respect in their own right as
individuals having intrinsic worth and dignity. Breaking an agreement is seen as a
violation of the other’s intrinsic dignity or value” (p. 30). Furthermore,
postconventionalists tend to believe that each individual has a responsibility to make
moral choices that uphold human rights even in cases where they conflict with society’s
laws or codes. Accordingly, Howell and Avolio (1992) found that the ethical leaders in
their study promoted visions that inspired followers to accomplish goals that were
beneficial for the organization as well as society, and these visions were “driven by
‘doing what’s right’ as opposed to ‘doing the right thing’” (p. 48). Additionally, empirical
evidence has demonstrated that complex moral reasoning (i.e., postconventionalism) is
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positively related to transformational leadership because postconventionalists have a
more sophisticated conceptualization of interpersonal situations, are likely to think about
problems from different perspectives, and are aware of a large number of behavioral
options (Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, & Milner, 2002).
Another bias that philanthropic leaders appear to use to rationalize their behavior
is referred to as the Efficacious Others bias. This bias is the tendency to frame others in
terms of their strengths and needs. With this bias in place, individuals tend to view others
as the origins of their own actions and have a proclivity to view each individual as a
unique source of human potential. This bias is reflected in implicit beliefs that social
influence is warranted in order to help individuals meet their needs, serve their interests,
and reach their maximum potential so that they may benefit the most from their actions.
Thus, leaders who have a strong Efficacious Others bias tend to view themselves as
humble servants of others and liberators of human potential. This line of reasoning tends
to justify acts aimed at developing others through positive and negative feedback,
training, coaching, and mentoring.
The Efficacious Others bias is reflected in research on socialized power. More
specifically, research suggests that individuals with a socialized power orientation tend to
view others as origins rather than pawns (McClelland, 1975) and seek office for the sake
of serving others (McClelland, 1970). Furthermore, Howell and Avolio (1992) concluded
that the ethical leaders in their study differed from the unethical leaders in that they
engaged in leadership that stressed serving rather than dominance, status, or prestige. The
ethical leaders in their study also expressed goals that were follower driven, and they
established visions that reflected the interests and desires of all of their stakeholders. In
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addition, these ethical leaders expressed extreme confidence in their followers and
focused on developing the individuals they interacted with to higher levels of ability,
motivation, and morality (Howell & Avolio, 1992).
Finally, the Stewardship Bias also serves to justify collective serving leadership
behaviors. The Stewardship Bias is a tendency to frame oneself as a steward who is
responsible for collective interests. According to the Stewardship theory (Davis,
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), “the model of man is based on a steward whose
behavior is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors have higher
utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors” (p. 24). That is, this bias involves as
unconscious proclivity to frame collectivistic behaviors as having a higher value than
individualistic behaviors (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). With this bias in
place, philanthropic leaders tend to favor collectivistic explanations for success as
opposed to individualistic explanations. Such reasoning tends to justify actions aimed at
meeting the needs of and developing the collective unit, building cohesion among group
members, getting all members to contribute to group processes, and inspiring others to go
beyond self-interests for the sake of the team.
Accordingly, McClelland (1975) found that socialized power is characterized by a
concern for group goals and for taking initiative in providing group members with the
resources needed to achieve group goals. Furthermore, individuals with a socialized
power orientation tend to use their influence to build organizational commitment and
create pride in belonging to the collective unit (McClelland, 1975). These individuals are
also likely to engage in participative management as a means of building commitment
(Yukl, 2002). Additionally, qualitative research on ethical leadership suggests that these
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leaders invite input from their followers and share recognition with others (Howell &
Avolio, 1992).
In sum, philanthropic leaders view themselves as stewards who are responsible
for serving individual and collective interests and protecting the intrinsic worth and
dignity of all individuals. Moreover, they tend to frame others as origins who need to be
guided and inspired to achieve collective goals. Philanthropic leaders do not think of
forgoing their own interests to serve collective interests as irrational; rather, they view
such actions as the justifiable behaviors of servants who are seeking to protect
fundamental human rights and maximize human potential (See Table 2.3 for a description
of Philanthropic JMs).
Present Research
The ultimate goal of this study was to improve researchers’ ability to identify
individuals who are likely to abuse power for personal gains as well as individuals who
are likely to use power to advance collective interests. Within the context of this paper, a
social cognitive approach to understanding and identifying these two groups of leaders
has been described. More specifically, it has been proposed that that the overt traits and
behaviors that constitute egotistic and philanthropic leadership are surface manifestations
of the JMs stemming from uninhibited and inhibited power motives. That is, it is assumed
that a strong uninhibited power motive shapes individuals’ reasoning biases, which in
turn influence them to express power in terms of narcissistic and aggressive leadership
behaviors. It is also believed that a strong inhibited power motive shapes individuals’
reasoning biases, which in turn influence them to express power in a morally responsible
manner that benefit others. In essence, it has been proposed within the it has been
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Table 2.3: Illustrative Justification Mechanisms for Philanthropic Leadership
Orientation.
Justification
Mechanism
Social Contract Bias

Definition
A tendency to frame society as a contractual commitment that
individuals with diverse values and opinions freely enter into in
order to preserve the rights and promote the welfare of all
individuals. Also involves a proclivity to frame “what is right”
as the preservation and protection of universal human rights for
all (e.g., life, free will, freedom of speech) and “what is wrong”
as the denial of these universal human rights. Reflected in an
implicit bias to frame norms, laws, and rules as a form of social
cooperation and agreement that all members are obligated to
uphold for the welfare of society unless they violate basic
human rights.

Efficacious Others
Bias

A tendency to frame others in terms of their strengths and
needs. Also includes a proclivity to view others as the origins
of their own actions and each individual as a unique source of
human potential. Reflected in an implicit belief that influence is
warranted in order to help individuals meet their needs, serve
their interests, and reach their maximum potential so that they
may benefit the most from their actions.

Stewardship Bias

A tendency to frame oneself as a steward who is responsible for
collective interests. Also involves an unconscious proclivity to
frame collectivistic behaviors as having a higher utility than
individualistic behaviors. Reflected in a tendency to favor
collectivistic explanations for success as opposed to
individualistic explanations.
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been proposed within the context of this paper, that justification mechanisms are key
predictors of unethical and ethical leadership.
Accordingly, the success of this study in improving researchers’ ability to identify
individuals who are likely to engage in unethical leadership behaviors as well as those
who are likely to engage in ethical leadership behaviors rests in part on two major
premises. The first is that the JMs identified in this paper accurately reflect the dominant
implicit biases that egotistic and philanthropic leaders rely on to enhance the rational
appeal of their contrasting behaviors. The second premise is that a conditional reasoning
test based on these JMs will significantly predict self-serving and collective-serving
leadership behaviors. Given these premises, three studies were conducted. The first study
was aimed at demonstrating the accuracy of the proposed JMs and the second and third
studies were designed to assess the validity of the CR measure.
Study 1
Given that JMs are believed to be an important contributor to unethical and
ethical leadership behaviors, it is necessary that the JMs identified in this paper
accurately reflect the dominant biases used by egotistic and philanthropic leaders to
rationalize their behaviors. However, while the implicit biases outlined above followed
from much of the literature on these two groups of leaders, the assumption that egotistic
and philanthropic leaders rely on different JMs has yet to be tested. Accordingly, the
purpose of the first study was to test this assumption by determining if Subject Matter
Experts (SME) in conditional reasoning can identify the six proposed egotistic JMs in
unethical leaders’ accounts of behavior and the three philanthropic JMs in ethical leaders’
accounts of behaviors.
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Research Question 1: Can SMEs identify a Potency bias, a Hostile
Attribution bias, a Others as Objects bias, a Superiority bias, a
Meritocracy bias and an Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias in
unethical leaders’ accounts of their behavior and the behavior of others?
Research Question 2: Can SMEs identify a Social Contract bias, an
Efficacious Others bias, and a Stewardship bias in highly ethical leaders’
accounts of their behavior and the behavior of others?
Study 2 & Study 3
The purpose of Study 2 and Study 3 was to provide preliminary support for the
argument that justification mechanisms are key predictors of egotistic and philanthropic
leadership. As previously mentioned, how and why leaders choose to influence their
followers and their surrounding environments is essentially what distinguishes the
“unethical” or egotistic leaders from the “ethical” or philanthropic leaders. According to
Conger and Kanungo (1998) controlling influence behaviors intended to advance the
leader’s self-interests are typically viewed as unethical (i.e., egotistic) behaviors, while
empowering influence behaviors intended to serve collective interests are generally
viewed as ethical (i.e., philanthropic) behaviors. Thus, the specific aim of Study 2 and
Study 3 was to demonstrate the validity of a CR test of egotistic and philanthropic
leadership orientations in predicting self-serving versus collective-serving influence
behaviors.
Given that influence is the essence of all leadership, researchers have begun to
study the specific types of behaviors used to exercise influence (Yukl, 1998). In
particular, many researchers have developed taxonomies of proactive influence tactics
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(Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Porter, Allen & Angle, 1981; Mowday, 1978;
Schilit & Locke, 1982; Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Zanzi, Arthur, & Shamir, 1991). While these
researchers have identified a number of different influence tactics, Kipnis and Schmidt
(1985) proposed that the various influence tactics could be classified into three broad
categories: hard tactics, soft tactics, and rational persuasion. These three categories with
the addition of a forth category (i.e., manipulation) served as the criteria of interest in
Study 2 & Study 3.
Hard tactics involve direct assertive requests for compliance from others (Kipnis
& Schmidt, 1985). These tactics include the use of authority, and they tend to be
exercised in an impersonal and calculated manner (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Specifically,
hard tactics entail pressure, legitimating, coalition, and some exchange tactics (Falbe &
Yukl, 1992). Pressure tactics consist of threats, warnings, and demands. Furthermore,
legitimating tactics involve attempts to establish the legitimacy of a request by claiming
that one has the authority or right to make it. Leaders may also establish the legitimacy of
a request by asserting that it is consistent with organizational policies, rules, or
procedures. Additionally, coalition influence attempts entail the use of others to persuade
a target to comply with a request. That is, these requests enlist the use of peers,
supervisors, or others to help influence the target. Yukl (1998) also noted that coalition
tactics use the endorsement of important people as a basis for making a stronger appeal to
the target. Finally, exchange tactics are considered a hard tactic when the leader offers a
favor or a benefit to the target in an impersonal and calculating manner in return for
doing what the agent requests.
Many of the behaviors typically associated with egotistic leadership fall under the
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category of hard influence tactics. For instance, research on unethical, egotistic leaders
suggests that these leaders demand that their decisions be followed without question (i.e.
pressure; Howell & Avolio, 1992). Research also suggests that these individuals use
primitive strategies to dominate others (McClelland, 1975). In particular, individuals with
a strong personalized power orientation are likely to use their authority to insist that their
requests be carried out (i.e., legitimating), use rewards to control subordinates (i.e.,
exchange), and they try to play different individuals against each other to keep these
individuals weak, but get what they want (i.e., coalition). Furthermore, hard tactics are
impersonal and tend to be self-serving, as they do not reflect a concern for others. Within
this paper, it has been proposed that egotistic leaders engage in such self-serving,
controlling behaviors because they view them as justifiable acts of superior individuals
who are seeking what they are entitled to, to show the world they are winners. Thus, it
was hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1: The extent to which individuals’ rely on egotistic JMs to
rationalize behavior would be positively related to the extent to which they
use hard influence tactics.
In contrast to hard tactics, soft tactics include influence attempts made in a polite,
friendly, or humble manner and usually involve flattering or sympathizing with the target
(Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). Soft tactics are based on personal power (i.e., referent and
expert power) and power sharing (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). These tactics consist of
consultation, inspirational appeals, personal appeals, and sincere ingratiation (Falbe &
Yukl, 1992). Consultation involves inviting the target person to participate in planning
how to carry out or implement a request. Moreover, inspirational appeals entail the use of
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an emotional or value-based appeal in an attempt to develop enthusiasm and commitment
for carrying out a request (Yukl, 1998). Through the use of inspirational appeals, leaders
arouse strong emotions and link requests to the target person’s needs, values, hopes, and
ideals. In addition to consultation and inspirational appeals, personal appeals are soft
tactics that involve asking the target to do a favor out of friendship. Lastly, sincere
ingratiation tactics include influence attempts that make the target think favorably of the
leader or seek to get the target in a good mood before making a request. Examples of
ingratiation include acting respectful and friendly, giving compliments, and doing
unsolicited favors (Yukl, 1998).
A number of the behaviors that constitute philanthropic leadership overlap
considerably with behaviors typically associated with soft tactics. Specifically, Howell
and Avolio (1992) found that ethical leaders continually seek input from targets (i.e.,
consultation). Additionally, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) maintained that these leaders
inspire others by focusing on their positive emotions as well as their hopes and ideals
(i.e., inspirational appeals). Similarly, they treat all individuals with dignity and respect
(i.e., ingratiation). These soft influence tactics appear to have a collective focus because
they demonstrate a concern for the needs and feelings of others. Accordingly,
philanthropic leaders are believed to engage in these behaviors because they view them
as the justifiable actions of individuals who serve collective interests and protect the
intrinsic worth and dignity of all people. Therefore, it was hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2: The extent to which individuals’ use philanthropic
JMs to rationalize behavior would be positively related to the extent to
which they use soft influence tactics.
35

Similarly, it was also expected that philanthropic leaders view rational persuasion
as a reasonable means of influencing others. More specifically, rational persuasion
involves the use of explanations, logical arguments, and factual evidence to persuade
others to adopt a request (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). According to Bass and Steidlmeier
(1999), philanthropic or authentic transformational leaders often engage in rational
discourse. Furthermore, research suggests that philanthropic leaders openly share both
positive and negative information with others so they can accurately evaluate the merits
of a request (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Howell & Avolio, 1992). Consequently, it was
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which individuals’ use philanthropic
JMs to rationalize behavior would be positively related to the extent to
which they use rational persuasion influence tactics.
Finally, although Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) argued that influence tactics fall
under one of three general categories (hard tactics, soft tactics, and rational persuasion),
Seabright and Moberg (1998) argued that manipulation is a distinct form of influence. In
general, manipulation involves seeking to win another party over through distortion of
reality or misrepresentation of intentions (Zanzi, Arthur, & Shamir, 1991). It also
includes selective disclosure, exaggerated claims, and “objective” speculation about
individuals or situations. Additionally, Seabright and Moberg (1998), maintained that
manipulation includes eliminating decision options, fabricating consequences or rules,
withholding or falsifying information about the situation, and attempts to complicate,
confuse, or misdirect the targets’ understanding of the influence episode or the request.
For instance, hollow justice misdirects targets into believing that leaders are being fair
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when in all actuality they are not (Greenberg, 1990). Similarly, using emotional
persuasion and insincere ingratiation to misguide the target is a form of manipulation.
Given that most manipulation attempts are self-serving (Seabright & Moberg,
1998), it is assumed that egotistic leaders view these influence tactics as sensible and
rational acts. Accordingly, many scholars have argued that egotistic leaders are indeed
manipulative and deceptive (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1998; Conger & Kanungo; 1998; House
& Howell, 1992; Howell & Avolio, 1992). For example, Bass and Steidlmeier (1998)
maintained that pseudo-transformational or egotistic leaders highlight fictitious “wethey” differences in values and they inspire others by focusing on unreal dangers or over
emphasizing negative consequences. Furthermore, they intellectually stimulate others by
providing logic containing false assumptions, setting agendas to manipulate the values of
followers, and substituting emotional argumentation for rational discourse (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1998). Hence, it was hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 4: The extent to which individuals’ use egotistic JMs
to rationalize behavior would be positively related to the extent to
which they use manipulation influence tactics.
In addition to testing the predictive validity of a CR test designed to measure
egotistic and philanthropic leadership orientations, Study 2 and Study 3 were also
designed to assess the convergent and discriminant validities of this test. As mentioned
above, egotistic leaders have been characterized as narcissistic, and high in
Machiavellianism (House & Howell, 1992). More specifically, narcissism is a broad
concept that involves a grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness, fantasies of
unlimited success, power, or beauty, entitlement, exhibitionism, an inability to tolerate
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criticism, indifference of others, lack of empathy, interpersonal exploitativeness, and
relationships that fluctuate from extremes of overidealization and devaluation (American
Psychiatric Association, 1980). Furthermore, Machiavellianism refers to the behavioral
tendency to maximize one’s self-interests at the expense of others using manipulation and
deceit (Christie & Geis, 1970). Much of the theoretical support for egotistic justification
mechanisms stems from literature on narcissism and Machiavellianism. Given that
narcissism and Machiavellianism have been linked to the proposed egotistic justification
mechanisms, it was hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 5: The use of egotistic JMs to rationalize behavior would be
positively related to narcissism.
Hypothesis 6: The use of egotistic JMs to rationalize behavior would be
positively related to Machiavellianism.
In contrast, philanthropic leaders are believed to be low in narcissism and
Machiavellianism. That is, the implicit reasoning biases used by philanthropic leaders
are contrary to the personality traits of narcissism and Machiavellianism. For instance,
prosocial leaders tend to view others as origins, while narcissistic individuals tend to
frame others as pawns or objects (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Hence, it was
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 7: The use of philanthropic JMs to rationalize behavior would
be negatively related to narcissism.

38

Hypothesis 8: The use of philanthropic JMs to rationalize behavior would
be negatively related to Machiavellianism.
Additionally, philanthropic leaders have been characterized as having a strong
sense of responsibility and high in emotional maturity (House & Howell, 1992).
According to Winter (1991), individuals have a strong sense of responsibility if they (a)
act on their own initiative, (b) take responsibility for their own actions, (c) are
dependable, and (d) are responsible for others. Furthermore, Yukl (2001) suggested that
emotionally mature individuals are more accurately aware of their strengths and
weaknesses than emotionally immature individuals, and they are focused on selfimprovement rather than denying their weaknesses and fantasizing about success. Yukl
(2001) also maintained that emotional mature individuals are likely to have high levels of
cognitive moral reasoning. Much of the theoretical support for philanthropic justification
mechanisms stems from literature on responsibility, moral reasoning, and emotional
maturity. Thus, given that responsibility and emotional maturity have been linked to
philanthropic justification mechanisms, it was hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 9: The use of philanthropic JMs to rationalize behavior would
be positively related to responsibility.
Hypothesis 10: The use of philanthropic JMs to rationalize behavior would
be positively related to emotional maturity.
Finally, research also suggests that egotistic leaders have a low sense of
responsibility and emotional maturity (Turner et al., 2002; Winter & Barenbaum, 1985).
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Specifically, Winter and Barenbaum (1985) found that leaders scoring low on
responsibility acted impulsively and frequently engaged in verbal attacks. Furthermore,
leaders who are low in emotional maturity have less self-control (e.g., they are less able
to resist self-serving temptations), they are more prone to angry outbursts, and they are
less receptive to criticism than individuals high in emotional maturity (Yukl, 2002). Thus,
it is seems that the self-serving behaviors that egotistic leaders justify as rational are
similar to the behaviors of individuals low in responsibility and low in emotional
maturity. Hence, it was hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 11: The use of egotistic JMs to rationalize behavior would be
negatively related to responsibility.
Hypothesis 12: The use of egotistic JMs to rationalize behavior would be
negatively related to emotional maturity.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Overview of Study 1
The purpose of the first study was to provide preliminary support for the
assumption that egotistic and philanthropic leaders rely on different implicit biases (i.e.,
Potency bias, Hostile Attribution, Others as Objects bias, Superiority bias, Meritocracy
bias, Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias, Social Contract bias, Servant of Efficacious
Others bias, and Stewardship bias) to enhance the rational appeal of the expression of
their motives. In particular, this study aimed to validate the six egotistic and three
philanthropic justification mechanisms by determining if Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
in conditional reasoning could detect the proposed justification mechanisms (JMs) in
self-serving and collective-serving leaders’ accounts of their behaviors and the behaviors
of others. Such a study is important because the results would lend support for a
conditional reasoning test based on these JMs given that the SMEs can detect the
proposed JMs in a number of egotistic and philanthropic leaders’ statements.
Participants and Procedures (Study 1)
Four industrial/organizational doctoral students at a large southeastern university
and two I/O PhDs who have been trained in conditional reasoning measurement systems,
conducted research using conditional reasoning tests, and who have had experience
writing conditional reasoning items were asked to serve as SMEs in this study. Each
SME read and evaluated 93 statements made by unethical and ethical leaders to
determine if they reflected any of the proposed justification mechanisms. More
specifically, each rater was given a description of the justification mechanisms and asked
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to carefully read a statement made by a business leader. After reading each statement, the
SMEs were asked to indicate which (if any) of the justification mechanisms was reflected
in the leader’s explanation of an action or event.
The statements included in the study were gathered from interviews and
autobiographies of business leaders who were identified as highly ethical or unethical in
published research and popular press articles (e.g., Collins, 2001; Dumaine & Berlin,
1993; Howell & Avolio, 1992; O’Reilly & Pfeffer, 2000; Reichheld, 1996; Wright &
Smye, 1996). The author of the present study read through the interviews and
autobiographies of 15 highly ethical leaders and 15 unethical leaders and selected
statements that expressed extreme viewpoints about the world and seemingly atypical
accounts for behavior. The author selected most of the statements included in the study
prior to identifying the implicit biases depicted in the leadership literature so as not to be
influenced by the JMs when reading through the interviews and autobiographies.
A minimum of three statements were recorded for each leader. A total of 279
statements (128 statements from highly ethical leaders and 151 statements from unethical
leaders) were extracted from the interviews and autobiographies. In order to ensure that
the statements were randomly selected to be included in the SME form, the statements
were sorted alphabetically in an Excel spreadsheet. Every third statement was selected for
the SME form. The final SME form had a total of 93 statements (45 statements from
highly ethical leaders and 48 statements from unethical leaders) for the SMEs to
categorize.
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Overview of Study 2
The purpose of the second study was to provide preliminary support for the
argument that justification mechanisms are key predictors of collective-serving and selfserving leadership. Specifically, Study 2 was designed to assess the predictive,
convergent, and discriminative validities of the conditional reasoning test of egotistic and
philanthropic leadership orientations. This test is an indirect system for measuring
individuals’ proclivity to rely on egotistic or philanthropic JMs to enhance the rational
appeal of self-serving or collective serving leadership behaviors. In Study 2, self-serving
leadership behaviors consisted of the hard influence tactics and manipulative influence
tactics exercised by members of a small group. Additionally, collective serving
leadership behaviors consisted of the soft influence tactics and rational persuasion
influence tactics used by the individual group members.
It was expected that individuals who have a strong proclivity to rely on egotistic
JMs would engage in hard and manipulative tactics to influence other group members on
a frequent basis. Conversely, it was expected that individuals who have a strong
proclivity to rely on philanthropic JMs would frequently attempt to influence others using
soft tactics and rational persuasion. Furthermore, it was posited that narcissism and
Machiavellianism would be positively related to a strong proclivity to rely on egotistic
JMs and negatively related to a strong proclivity to rely on philanthropic JMs. It was also
expected that responsibility and emotional maturity would be positively correlated with a
strong proclivity to rely on philanthropic JMs and negatively correlated with a strong
proclivity to rely on egotistic JMs.
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Participants and Procedures (Study 2)
Two-hundred eighty-nine undergraduate business students at a large southeastern
university were recruited to participate in the current study. The participants completed
the CRT-A during regular class sessions and completed the other measures used in the
study on the day they engaged in the task. Of the 289 undergraduate students who were
recruited to participate in the study, there was incomplete data for approximately ten
percent of the students. Furthermore, approximately ten percent of the students supplied
more than three illogical responses on either the CRT-A or the newly created CR items.
These students were removed from the study. In total, there were complete, useable data
on 235 students (53% male; 47% female). The average age of the students was 21 years
old.
The participants took part in a group decision-making task/team-building exercise
as part of their coursework. The group exercise that the students participated in was
funded by and designed for the National Science Foundation. According to the
instructions of the group decision-making task, each participant assumed the role as a
member of a business development committee for a roller coaster construction company.
Each participant along with 3-5 other team members were asked to work out the details
necessary for writing a bid to build a roller coaster for a major theme park. Specifically,
the details they needed to determine included 1) the design of the coaster by selecting one
of the 4 provided coaster designs, 2) the theme of the selected coaster, 3) the total cost for
the coaster, and 4) the time it would take to build the coaster.
Prior to meeting with their group, each participant had a week to read through all
of the materials related to the exercise and determine on their own the specifics they
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would like to include in the bid. To encourage the students not to talk to any of their
classmates concerning the exercise prior to engaging in the exercise, the students were
told that each member of the group with the best design would receive a twenty-five
dollar gift certificate to a pre-approved store. The participants were also told that the
groups would be randomly assigned the day of the exercise; thus, anyone they might
speak to about the task could be a potential competitor.
Each group member was assigned a different role to play (i.e., Human Resources
Director, Finance Director, Director of Logistics and Transportation, Safety Manager,
and Design Team Manager). Included in each of the packets of the group decisionmaking materials was a letter that was unique to each of the group members. For
instance, the HR director received specific information regarding union issues that no one
else in his or her group received. Within the unique information provided to the
individual group members were specific details concerning a problem that was designed
to create a conflict with another group member. As an example, the Design Team
Manager was encouraged to persuade the group to build the most elaborate and most
expensive coaster design while the Finance Director was encouraged to keep costs at a
minimum.
Each group was recorded with the use of a video camera as they engaged in the
decision-making task. All individuals were informed that they would be videotaped in the
group setting prior to engaging in the task. Six undergraduate Psychology students
watched the video tapes to record and categorize each group member’s attempts to
influence others in the group. These process coders were trained by the author on how to
record and classify each of the influence attempts. All coders completed an influence
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tactics worksheet prior to coding the video tapes. Furthermore, the first six to ten
videotapes that the coders coded were discussed with the author. Once the author felt
that the coders’ codings were calibrated with the SME’s codings (i.e., the author’s
codings) they were allowed to code independently. Each videotape was watched by two
of the six process coders. Moreover, for reliability purposes the coder pairs were
constantly rotated so that no one coder watched the same complete set of videotapes as
another coder.
Measures
Egotistic and Philanthropic Conditional Reasoning Items. Given that several of
the justification mechanisms linked to egotistic leadership stem from the need to aggress
(i.e., the Potency bias, the Hostile Attribution bias, and the Derogation of Target bias),
the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A; James & McIntyre, 2000) was
used in this study. The CRT-A is composed of 22 conditional reasoning problems. Each
conditional reasoning item consists of an inductive reasoning problem that appears to
measure critical thinking skills, but what is actually being assessed is a justification
mechanism (James & Mazerolle, 2002; see Figure 3.1 for an example CRT-A item). For
each conditional reasoning item, respondents are asked to identify the most reasonable
conclusion based on a set of premises, given that more than one conclusion may appear
reasonable. Respondents select the most reasonable conclusion from four alternatives:
one alternative is designed to appeal to an aggressive individual’s implicit biases, one
alternative is designed to appeal to a nonaggressive individual’s implicit biases, and two
of the alternatives serve as illogical distracters.
To score the CRT-A, respondents are given a +1 for every aggressive response
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Half of all marriages end in divorce. One reason for the large number of divorces is that
getting a divorce is quick and easy. If a couple can agree on how to split their property fairly, then
they can get a divorce simply by filling out forms and taking them to court. They do not need
lawyers.
Which of the following is the most logical conclusion based on the above?
a. People are older when they get married. (Distracter alternative)
b. If one’s husband or wife hires a lawyer, then he or she is not planning to play fair.
(Aggressive-Hostile Attribution bias alternative)
c. Couples might get back together if getting a divorce took longer. (Nonaggressive
alternative)
d. More men than women get divorced. (Distracter alternative)

Figure 3.1 Example Item from the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression.

they select, and a zero for every illogical or nonaggressive response they select. A high
score on this scale indicates that a respondent has a strong proclivity to reason in ways
that justify aggression and is implicitly willing to engage in some form of aggressive
behavior (James, 1998). A low score on this scale indicates that the respondent is not
implicitly prepared to engage in aggressive behavior (James, 1998). Acceptable reliability
coefficients for the CRT-A were found for this study (.71) and are reported in the CRT-A
test manual (James & McIntyre, 2000). The validity of the CRT-A is also reviewed in the
manual (James & McIntyre, 2000).
In addition to the total readiness to aggress score, scale scores were computed
based on the factor structure discussed by James, McIntyre, Glisson, Green, Patton,
LeBreton, Frost, Sablynski, Mitchell, and William, (2005). Given that the Potency bias
and the Hostile Attribution bias are believed to be important egotistic JMs, scores were
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computed for both of theses subscales. While the Others as Objects/Derogation of Target
bias is also believed to be a key egotistic JM, only one CRT-A item taps into this JM;
thus, there is not a Others as Objects/Derogation of Target subscale in the CRT-A.
Acceptable reliability coefficients for the Hostile Attribution bias subscale (HAB) and the
Potency bias (PB) were found for this study (HAB: .78; PB: .82).
In addition to the 22 items on the CRT-A, the primary researcher wrote twentyfour conditional reasoning items designed to measure the three egotistic JMs not
measured by the CRT-A (i.e., a Superiority bias, a Meritocracy bias, and an Infinitely
Manipulatable Universe bias) and twenty-four items designed to measure the three
philanthropic JMs (i.e., a Social Contract bias, a Efficacious Others bias, and a
Stewardship bias). Additionally, given that there is only one “Others as Objects” item in
the CRT-A, an item was developed to measure this JM. In writing the items, premises
(e.g., data, events, logical arguments, explanations, assumptions) were constructed
around themes known to trigger these egotistic and philanthropic JMs. Using these
premises, an inductive reasoning task was created such that the respondents were asked to
reason from the given premises to a reasonable conclusion. Like the CRT-A, four
alternative conclusions were developed for each set of premises: an egotistic or
philanthropic alternative, a nonegotistic or nonphilanthropic logical alternative, and two
illogical alternatives.
Two subject matter experts in conditional reasoning reviewed each of the items
for face validity as an inductive reasoning task. Based on the SMEs’ comments, eight
items were slightly revised (i.e., minor changes were made to the alternatives included in
an item) and twenty-two items were substantially revised (i.e., major changes were made
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to the item’s premises or the alternatives). Furthermore, fourteen items were deleted
because they did not appear to be inductive reasoning tasks and could not be reworked.
After revisions, three Superiority items were retained, six Meritocracy items were
retained, four Infinitely Manipulatable Universe items were retained, one Others as
Objects item was retained, seven Social Contract items were retained, four Efficacious
Others items were retained, and five Stewardship items were retained. These 30 items
were then given to undergraduate business students to complete. More specifically, 194
students responded to 15 of the items and 111 students responded to the other 15 items.
The students’ responses were used to assess the distribution of the selected alternatives
for each of the items. Three items were deleted (one Efficacious Others item and two
Stewardship items) because at least 80 percent of the students selected the philanthropic
alternative. Thus, it was determined that these items would not adequately discriminate
between philanthropic and nonphilanthropic individuals. In addition to the deletion of
these items, seven items were revised to make the distracter alternatives even more
illogical and nine items were revised to strengthen the nonegotistic or nonphilanthropic
alternative. A total of twenty-seven items of the initial forty-eight items written by the
author were retained for this study. The scoring of these items follows from the scoring
system developed for the CRT-A. Respondents were given a +1 for every egotistic or
philanthropic response they selected and a zero for every illogical, nonegotistic or
nonphilanthropic response they selected. (See Figure 3.2 for examples of an egotistic
item and a philanthropic item).
Narcissism. An abridged version of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI)
developed by Raskin and Hall (1979) was used to measure the multidimensional
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Egotistic CR Item
Trendy new restaurants in New York often
have extensive waiting lists of people who
want to eat at these restaurants. On average,
most people have to reserve a table at least
two months in advance in order to eat at these
restaurants. Yet, celebrities will be seated
immediately if they want to eat at these new
restaurants even though they do not have a
reservation.
Which of the following is the most logical
conclusion based on the above?
a. Trendy new restaurants have a limited
menu selection. (Distracter alternative)
b. To make room for celebrities, someone
else has to wait even longer for a table.
(Nonegotistic alternative)
c. Restaurants with valet service are less
popular than restaurants without valet
service. (Distracter alternative)

Philanthropic CR Item
In problem-solving tasks, groups produce
better solutions than do individuals. But groups
take far longer than individuals to develop
solutions and make decisions. Few
organizations use groups to solve problems.
Which of the following is the most logical
conclusion based on the above?
a. Engineering teams are more effective than
manufacturing teams. (Distracter
alternative)
b. Most organizations are pressed for time
when it comes to decision-making.
(Nonphilanthropic alternative)
c. Most organizations would be better off if
they relied on groups rather than individuals
to solve problems. (PhilanthropicStewardship bias alternative)
d. Bigger groups make decisions faster than
smaller groups. (Distracter alternative)

d. Special people like celebrities should not
have to wait for a table. (EgotisticMeritocracy bias alternative)

Figure 3.2: Example Egotistic and Philanthropic Conditional Reasoning Items.
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construct of narcissism. The NPI was designed to capture narcissism in nonclinical
populations (Raskin & Hall, 1979). The abridged version was derived from a factor
analytic study of the 54-item NPI conducted by Emmons (1987), and it has been used in
previous research (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998).
Respondents answer “true” or “false” for each of the 37-items. The construct validity and
the internal consistency of the NPI has been demonstrated in several studies (Emmons,
1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988). The reliability coefficient for this study was acceptable (α
= .80).
Machiavellianism. The 20-item Mach IV scale developed by Christie and Geis
(1970) to measure Machiavellianism was used in this study. Each item was measured on
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Acceptable
construct validity and internal consistency of the Mach IV has been demonstrated in
several studies (Christie & Geis, 1970). However, the reliability found for this study was
somewhat low (α = .56).
Responsibility. The California Personality Inventory (CPI) responsibility scale
was used in this study (Gough & Bradley, 1996). This scale assesses the degree to which
individuals are conscientious, responsible, and dependable in terms of disposition and
temperament. Respondents answer “true” or “false” for each of the 36 items. Extensive
evidence suggests that the CPI responsibility scale is reliable and valid (Gough &
Bradley, 1996). The internal reliability of the CPI responsibility scale for this study was
.67.
Emotional Maturity. The California Personality Inventory (CPI) socialization
scale was used in this study (Gough & Bradley, 1996) to measure emotional maturity.
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The socialization scale measures social maturity, integrity, and rectitude. Respondents
answer “true” or “false” for each of the 46 items. The construct validity and the internal
consistency of the CPI are satisfactory (Gough & Bradley, 1996). In addition, the internal
consistency of the CPI socialization scale was acceptable for this study (α = .72).
Influence Tactics. Influence tactics were measured by the total frequency of
behaviors observed by the process coders for each of the four influence tactics (i.e., hard
tactics, soft tactics, rational persuasion, and manipulative tactics). A coding sheet was
developed to assist the processes coders in categorizing the observed behaviors. The
coding sheet was divided into four sections for each of the four tactics and a description
was given for each category of tactic. Furthermore, a description was given for the
specific types of tactics that fell under hard, soft, and manipulative influence tactics (i.e.,
hard tactics: pressure, legitimating, coalition, and some exchange tactics; soft tactics:
consultation, inspirational appeals, personal appeals, and sincere ingratiation;
manipulative tactics: falsifying claims, exaggerating claims, and stating opinions as fact;
See Figure 3.3 for an example of a section of the coding sheet).
Overview of Study 3
Like Study 2, the purpose of the third study was to offer empirical support for the
argument that justification mechanisms are key predictors of unethical and ethical
leadership. Thus, Study 3 was also designed to assess the predictive, convergent, and
discriminative validities of a CR measure designed to predict egotistic and philanthropic
leadership behaviors. Essentially, Study 3 was a partial replication of Study 2 except that
the CPI narcissism scale was used instead of the NPI, Machiavellianism was not
measured, and the hypotheses were assessed across five different situations: a group
52

Influence Tactics Coding Sheet
Hard Tactics: direct assertive requests for compliance from others
•

Pressure Tactics (threats, warnings, and demands):
Total # of
tactics

•

Legitimating Tactics (claiming that one has the authority or right to make a
request; asserting that a request is consistent with organizational policies, rules, or
procedures):

•

Coalition Tactics (requests that enlist the use of peers, supervisors, or others to
help influence the target; the endorsement of important people as a basis for
making a stronger appeal to the target; e.g. “The CEO said this was important”):

•

Exchange Tactics (offering a favor or a benefit to the target in an impersonal and
calculating manner in return for doing what the influence agent requests):

Figure 3.3: An Example Page from the Influence Tactics Coding Sheet.
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decision making exercise, a one-on-one meeting with an aggressive role player, a one-onone meeting with a passive role player, a persuasive letter, and an in-basket exercise. This
study is important in that it not only assessed if individuals with a strong proclivity to rely
on egotistic JMs would frequently influence others using hard and manipulative tactics,
but also if this measure would predict these influence tactics across situations.
Participants and Procedures (Study 3)
One hundred twenty-five (79% male and 21% female) senior executives,
aerospace industry managers, and physicians with managerial experience enrolled in
MBA programs offered at a large southeastern university were recruited to participate in
this study. The managers involved with this study represented a variety of industries
including banking, insurance, manufacturing, health, and military. Furthermore, the
participants held a wide variety of managerial positions including vice president of sales,
chief of staff, head controller, safety manager, and company president.
All of the participants went through a developmental assessment center and
completed several personality measures for the Leadership Development component of
their degree. In addition to completing the required personality measures, participants
were asked to complete the CRT-A and the other CR items designed to measure egotistic
and philanthropic leadership orientations. Approximately, 25% of the participants
completed the CR items online, while the other 75% completed forms that were mailed to
them and returned at a later date. There was not a single participant from this study that
selected more than three illogical responses on either the CRT-A or the items developed
for this study.
During the first week of classes, the participants took part in a 1-day management
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development assessment center consisting of role-playing exercises, an in-basket
exercise, and a leaderless group discussion. More specifically, in the role-playing
exercises, the participants were assigned to the role of a regional manager for a major
company. In the course of two hours, the participants met individually with two of their
subordinates (i.e., the role players) and then drafted a letter to their supervisor regarding
promotion recommendations. The first subordinate whom the participants met with was a
driven, task-oriented district manager who wanted to terminate one of her employees.
The second subordinate the participants met with was a laid-back district manager
looking for advice. In addition to the role-playing exercises, the participants also took
part in a leaderless group discussion in which the group consisting of 4-5 members was
charged with allocating money to fund various school board proposals. Finally, the
participants completed an in-basket exercise. In this exercise, they were assigned the role
of a plant manager and asked to address many issues facing the company.
The assessment center raters were doctoral I/O psychology students who had
received frame-of-reference training that followed the requirements set forth in the
Guidelines and Ethical Considerations for Assessment Center Operations (Task Force on
Assessment Center Guidelines, 1989). The training content included general assessment
skills of observing, recording, categorizing, and evaluating behaviors. Each assessor
records specific behaviors as they observe the participants engaging in the interpersonal
exercises and record critical incidents from completed written exercises. Each recorded
behavior is than categorized into one of fifteen behavioral dimensions that assess
management-relevant behavior (e.g., oral communication, delegation, leadership,
coaching, team building, confrontation, and sensitivity).
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Using these ratings sheets, six doctoral students in I/O psychology (including the
author) and one I/O Psychology Ph.D. who were extremely familiar with the assessment
center exercises were asked to code all of the influence behaviors described on the ratings
sheets for each given participant. These ratings sheets served almost as transcripts of
what each participant said or wrote during the exercises, as the assessment center raters
are trained to quote all critical statements made by the participant. The process coders
were trained by the author how to record and classify each of the influence tactics
detailed on the rating sheets using the influence tactics coding sheet described in 3.3.
Furthermore, the process coders completed an influence tactics worksheet prior to coding
behaviors. The influence tactics described on the rating sheets for each participant were
coded by two of the seven process coders. For reliability purposes the coder pairs were
constantly rotated so that no one coder coded all of the same participants’ rating sheets as
another coder.
Measures
Narcissism. Wink and Gough’s (1990) narcissism scale for the California
Psychological Inventory (CPI) was used in this study. This scale was developed to
capture narcissism in nonclinical populations (Wink & Gough, 1990). Respondents
answer “true” or “false” for each of the 49-items. An example item is “I have often met
people who were supposed to be experts who were no better than I”. The reliability of
this scale was acceptable (α = .79). Furthermore, Wink and Gough (1990) have
demonstrated construct validity for their Narcissism scale.
Previously Mentioned Measures. In addition to completing the CPI Narcissism
scale, the participants in this study completed the CRT-A, the new CR items developed
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for this study, the CPI Responsibility scale, and the CPI Socialization scale which were
described under Study 2. The reliabilities for these measures were acceptable (CRT-A:
.76; HAB: .80; PB: .73; CPI Responsibility: .71; CPI Socialization: .73). However, one
CRT-A item was removed for data analyses purposes because there was no variance in
the respondents’ answers. That is, all of the managers in this study selected the prosocial
response for this item.
Composite Key Development
Consistent with early validation efforts of the CRT-A, in which items were
empirically keyed against aggression criteria, each conditional reasoning item developed
for this study was keyed against the influence tactics criteria. Polyserial and polychoric
correlations were computed between each conditional reasoning item and the influence
tactics. Polyserial correlations were deemed to be the appropriate statistic given that the
predictors were categorical characterizations of continuous latent constructs.
Any theoretically appropriate item that correlated .20 or greater with the criteria
were retained for inclusion into the composite scale, with separate scales being
constructed for each criterion. This was undertaken in both studies, thus a maximum of
eight scales were possible, one based on each criterion measured in the studies. Each
scale was cross-validated on the other sample. Results of all analyses are presented in
Chapter IV.
Although some authors have cautioned against the use of empirical keying in test
development (e.g., Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), the approach was deemed reasonable
because the initial item pool was theoretically derived. Additionally, two individuals with
experience in conditional reasoning item development and validation provided input on
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the items. It is important to restate that only theoretically appropriate items correlating
with the criterion would be included in the composite scales. Thus, for instance, if one of
the reasoning items designed to measure philanthropic leadership correlated with hard or
manipulative influence tactics, this item would not be included in the egotistic composite
score.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Study 1
As previously noted, the first study was designed to test the assumption that
egotistic and philanthropic leaders rely on different implicit biases (i.e., Potency bias,
Hostile Attribution, Others as Objects bias, Superiority bias, Meritocracy bias, Infinitely
Manipulatable Universe bias, Social Contract bias, Efficacious Others bias, and
Stewardship bias) to enhance the rational appeal of the expression of their motives. The
results suggested that the SMEs were able to identify the six proposed egotistic JMs in
unethical leaders’ accounts of behavior and the three philanthropic JMs in ethical leaders’
accounts of behaviors. Across the 93 statements, the SMEs agreed on the JMs that were
evident as well as not evident in the statements 82% of the time. The SMEs were in more
agreement across the unethical leaders’ quotes (84% agreement) than the highly moral
leaders’ quotes (76% agreement). A quote was classified as representing a JM if at least 4
out of 6 SMEs agreed that a leader’s statement evidenced that JM.
The SMEs identified at least one of the egotistic JMs in 87.23% of the statements
made by unethical leaders. More specifically, the SMEs identified the Potency bias in 13
of the unethical leaders’ statements, and the Hostile Attribution bias in four of the
unethical leaders’ statements. Furthermore, the SMEs identified the Others as Objects
bias in 12 of the unethical leaders’ statements, the Superiority bias in 10 of unethical
leaders’ statements, and the Meritocracy bias in four of unethical leaders’ statements. The
Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias was only identified in three of unethical leaders’
statements. Moreover, the SMEs did not identify any of philanthropic JMs in the
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statements made by unethical leaders.
Additionally, the SMEs identified at least one of the philanthropic JMs in 84.78%
of the statements made by ethical leaders. They identified the Social Contract bias in 13
of the statements made by ethical leaders and the Efficacious Others bias in 14 of these
leaders’ statements. The Stewardship bias was identified in 16 of ethical leaders’
statements. Finally, the SMEs did not identify any of egotistic JMs in the statements
made by highly ethical leaders.
Study 2 & Study 3
Prior to testing the hypothesized relationships, measures of consistency and
agreement were calculated to determine if it was appropriate to aggregate the process
coders’ recordings of influence tactics. Given that two process coders were randomly
selected to code each video, Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) for random effects
as opposed to fixed effects were calculated (McGraw & Wong, 1996). The ICC indices
for consistency and agreement are shown in table 4.1. The average ICCs for the coded
influence tactics from Study 2 ranged from .81 to .90. Furthermore, the average ICCs for
the coded influence tactics from Study 3 ranged from .77 to .86. Altogether, the levels of
consistency and agreement were reasonable; thus, it was deemed appropriate to aggregate
the codings.
Additionally, sex differences in the personality measures and influence tactics
were investigated prior to examining the correlations among the study variables. Prior
research has demonstrated that males tend to score higher on measures of narcissism and
Machiavellianism (Lee & Ashton, 2005; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991; Wink &
Gough, 1990). In support of these previous findings, undergraduate males from Study 2
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Table 4.1: Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for Influence Tactic Codings.
ICC (Two-Way Random
Effects; Consistency)
Study 2
Study 3
Hard Tactics
.81
Soft Tactics
.90
Rational Persuasion
.85
Manipulation
.90
Note: n = 235 (Study 2); n = 125 (Study 3).

.86
.84
.79
.85

ICC (Two-Way Random
Effects; Agreement)
Study 2
Study 3
.81
.90
.85
.90

.86
.84
.77
.85

scored higher than females on the personality measures, but there were no differences in
the influence tactics or the conditional reasoning items. Thus, for the development of the
composite scales, all data from Study 2 were pooled together. However, for testing
Hypotheses 5-12, analyses were conducted separately for the male and female samples.
Conversely, no gender differences were found for Study 3. Therefore, all data were
pooled together. Means and standard deviations for the male and female participants from
Study 2 and Study 3 are shown in Table 4.2.
Composite Key Development (Study 2). As stated in Chapter 3, any theoretically
appropriate conditional reasoning item (developed for this study) correlating .20 or
greater with the criteria was retained for inclusion in the composite key. Based on this
scoring protocol, three items developed for this study keyed empirically against the hard
influence tactics. A unit-weighted composite scale was created for these items and is
designated HT Key 1. The initial validity between this composite and the criterion was
.42. Furthermore, the reliability coefficient obtained using a derivative of the KR-20
formula which computes internal consistency reliability using item-total polyserial
correlation coefficients (James, et al., 2005) was .85. See Table 4.3 for items that
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Table 4.2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Independent T-tests for Male and Female Participants.
Study 2
Males
m
sd
1.15 1.10
1.12 1.11

Study 2
Females
m
sd
1.20 1.22
1.34 1.27

t
-0.324
-1.43

Study 3
Males
m
sd
2.39 1.67
2.78 1.76

Study 3
Females
m
sd
2.79 1.73
2.63 1.36

t
-1.29
0.40

Hard Tactics
Soft Tactics
Rational
Persuasion
4.43 2.6
4.56 2.25
-0.40 5.11 1.63 5.65 1.69
-1.51
Manipulative
Tactics
0.86 0.97
0.80 1.01
0.47 1.20 1.00 1.25 1.09
-0.24
Egotistic Items
3.97 1.98
3.59 1.74
1.56 2.90 1.57 2.97 1.73
0.39
Philanthropic
Items
4.14 1.79
3.81 1.73
1.42 3.56 1.71 3.23 1.45
1.62
CRT-A
3.74 1.78
3.55 1.81
0.82 4.48 2.21 4.73 1.99
-0.52
Socialization
29.61 5.62
33.81 5.18 -5.93** 28.39 4.01 28.50 4.77
-0.12
Responsibility
22.31 4.31
25.60 3.85 -6.14** 26.55 3.60 26.88
3.6
-0.43
NPI
18.26 6.08
15.75 6.55
3.05**
Mach IV
55.61 6.18
52.32 5.85
4.18**
CPI-Narcissism
24.55 5.95 23.65 4.94
1.12
Note: Study 2 n = 235 (males = 124; females = 111); Study 3 n =125 (males = 99; females = 26); Study 2 participants did not
complete the CPI-Narcissism measure; Study 3 participants did not complete the NPI or the Mach IV; * = p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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Table 4.3: Summary of New CR Items that Empirically Keyed Against Criteria.
HT
Key
1

HT
Key
2

ST
Key
1

ST
Key
2

MT
Key
1

MT
Key
2

Item
Students' health is not the
responsibility of the
school system.

Underlying JM
Meritocracy
Bias

x

The best teachers are
entitled to go over budget.

Meritocracy
Bias

x

Talented real estate agents
earn lots of money despite
trends in the market.

Infinitely
Manipulatable
Universe bias

x

Skilled bike riders are
subjected to needless laws.

Meritocracy
Bias

x

People without children in
public schools pay too
much in property taxes.

Meritocracy
Bias

x

x

Teenagers are easy to
manipulate.

Others as
Objects Bias

x

x

There is little reason to
follow the rules when
filling out tax returns.

Meritocracy
Bias

Some people protect
human life even without
the Good Samaritan law.

Social
Contract Bias

x

People stock up on
supplies to share with
others in times of need.

Social
Contract Bias

x

A company is socially
responsible if it has an
emergency pool for sick
days.

Social
Contract Bias

x

The right to life is more
important than the right to
property.

Social
Contract Bias

x
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x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

empirically keyed against the influence tactics and Table 4.4 for the correlations between
CR items and the criteria for Study 2.
Two philanthropic items met the inclusion criterion when keyed against the soft
influence tactics. A composite scale was created for these items and is designated ST Key
1. The initial validity between ST Key 1 and the soft influence tactics was .32 (see Table
4.4). The reliability for this composite scale was .86. There were no theoretically
appropriate items that meet the inclusion criteria when keyed against the rational
persuasion influence tactics. Thus, no composite scale was created for this criterion.
Finally, four theoretically appropriate items correlated .20 or greater with the
manipulative influence tactics. A unit-weighted composite scale was created for these
items and is designated MT Key 1. The initial validity between this composite and the
criterion was .43 (see Table 4.4). Additionally, the internal consistency coefficient for
MT Key 1 was .80.
Composite Key Development (Study 3). Using the scoring protocol described
above, four items keyed empirically against the hard influence tactics. The composite
scale created for these items is designated HT Key 2. The reliability coefficient for HT
Key 2 was .87 and the initial validity between this composite and the criterion was .38.
See Table 4.3 for items that empirically keyed against the influence tactics and Table 4.5
for correlations among all Study 3 variables.
Three philanthropic items met the inclusion criterion when keyed against the soft
influence tactics. A composite scale was created for these items and is designated ST Key
2. The internal consistency coefficient was .76 and the initial validity between ST Key 2
and the soft influence tactics was .34 (see Table 4.5). As with Study 2, there were no
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Table 4.4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations between CR Items and Influence Tactics Criteria for Study 2.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
m
sd
1. HT Key 1 .88
.92
1.00
2. HT Key 2 .90
.89
.53**
1.00
3. ST Key 1
.42 .58
.05
-.17** 1.00
.57**
1.00
4. ST Key 2 1.24 .86
.03
-.20**
5. MT Key 1 1.02 1.02
.98**
.68**
-.05
-.03
1.00
6. MT Key 2 .69
.81
.10
.31**
-.19** -.20** .31** 1.00
.11
.00
-.04
.19** .03
1.00
7. HAB
.60
.65
.22**
8. PB
.50
.65
.10
-.03
.08
.04
.11
-.05
-.08
1.00
9. CRT A
3.65 1.79
.19**
.11
.07
.06
.18** .09
.56** .43** 1.00
10. HT
1.17 1.16
.42**
.23**
-.06
-.10
.42** .04
.05
-.03
.19** 1.00
11. ST
1.22 1.19
.08
.01
.32**
.02
.06
-.06
-.07
.13
.01
.10
1.00
12. RP
4.49 2.43
.24**
.11
.12
.06
.25** -.02
.03
.08
.10
.39** .26** 1.00
.24**
-.04
-.06
.43** .13
.19** .09
.20** .50** .13
.36**
13. MT
.83
.99
.40**
Note: n = 235; HT = Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB =
Hostile Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; *
= p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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Table 4.5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among all Study 3 Variables.

1. HT Key 1
2. HT Key 2

m
.62
.85

sd
.67
1.01

1
1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.00
.66**
3. ST Key 1 .42
.54
-.21* -.30** 1.00
4. ST Key 2 1.16
.93
.04
.04
.67**
1.00
5. MT Key 1
.78
.79
.98** .79**
-.23**
.02
1.00
6. MT Key 2 .55
.83
.34** .58**
-.26** -.16
.58**
1.00
-.17*
-.16
.23**
.14
1.00
7. HAB
.64
.65
.19* .15
8. PB
.74
.74
.15
.22*
-.10
-.05
.16
.22*
.10
1.00
-.18*
-.16
.34**
.41**
.46**
.57**
1.00
9. CRT A
4.53
2.16 .27** .41**
10. HT
2.47
1.69
.20* .38**
-.09
-.12
.26**
.35**
.08
.03
.11
1.00
.34**
.05
-.18*
-.14
-.13
-.28** .01
11. ST
2.74
1.68
.07
-.11
.20*
12. RP
5.22
1.65 -.17* .02
-.02
.00
-.09
.06
.07
.05
-.03
.21*
13. MT
1.22
1.02 .25** .37**
-.31** -.22*
.30**
.42**
.23**
.15
.44**
.43**
14. Narc
24.36
5.74 .28** .21*
.00
-.04
.22**
.13
-.17*
.17*
.06
.13
15. Resp
26.62
3.58 -.18* -.09
.09
.20**
-.16
.01
.02
.09
-.13
-.05
16. Social
28.41
4.16 -.13
-.13
-.01
.08
-.06
.02
-.02
-.02
-.09
-.26**
Note: n = 125; Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB = Hostile
Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; Narc =
CPI Narcissism Scale; Resp = CPI Responsibility Scale; Social = CPI Socialization Scale; * = p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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Table 4.5: Continued
11

12

13

14

15

16

1. HT Key 1
2. HT Key 2
3. ST Key 1
4. ST Key 2
5. MT Key 1
6. MT Key 2
7. HAB
8. PB
9. CRT A
10. HT
11. ST
1.00
12. RP
.09
1.00
13. MT
-.10
.02 1.00
14. Narc
.04
-.08
.29** 1.00
15. Resp
.05
.07
-.05
-.38** 1.00
16. Social
-.03
.00
-.16
-.38** .35** 1.00
Note: n = 125; Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB = Hostile
Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; Narc =
CPI Narcissism Scale; Resp = CPI Responsibility Scale; Social = CPI Socialization Scale; * = p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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theoretically appropriate items that meet the inclusion criteria when keyed against the
rational persuasion influence tactics. Thus, no composite scale was created for this
criterion.
Finally, four theoretically appropriate items correlated .20 or greater with the
manipulative influence tactics. A unit-weighted composite scale was created for these
items and is designated MT Key 2. The initial validity between this composite and the
criterion was .42 (see Table 4.5). Additionally, the reliability coefficient for MT Key 2
was .87.
Validity Evidence
Hypothesis 1: The first hypothesis proposed that the extent to which individuals
rely on egotistic justifications mechanisms to rationalize behavior would be positively
related to the extent to which they use hard influence tactics. The results of this study
provide some support for this hypothesis. Three items had a .20 or greater correlation
with the hard influence tactics coded in Study 2 (HT Key 1) and four items had a .20 or
greater correlation with the hard influence tactics coded in Study 3 (HT Key 2). One of
these items overlapped and was part of HT Key 1 and HT Key 2 (see Table 4.3). HT Key
1 was positively related to the hard influence tactics in Study 2 (r = .42, p < .01), and
Study 3 (r = .20, p < .05). Furthermore HT Key 2 was positively related to the hard
influence tactics coded in Study 2 (r = .23, p < .01), and in Study 3 (r = .38, p <.01).
The reliability coefficients obtained using a derivative of the KR-20 formula for HT Key
1 were .85 (Study 2) and .76 (Study 3). Moreover the reliability coefficients obtained for
HT Key 2 were .75 (Study 2) and .87 (Study 3). Finally, like typical distributions for the
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CRT-A, the distributions for HT Key 1 and HT Key 2 had a significant positive skew
(see Table 4.6), but only HT Key 2 in Study 3 demonstrated a leptokurtotic distribution
as is typical with the CRT-A. For a summary of items that empirically keyed against the
hard influence tactics see Table 4.3.
In addition to the items that were developed for this study to measure the
Meritocracy bias, the Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias, the Superiority bias, and the
Others as Objects bias, the CRT-A and two CRT-A subscales (Hostile Attribution bias
and Potency bias) were examined in relation to the criteria. Throughout this paper it has
been proposed that the Hostile Attribution bias and the Potency bias are key egotistic
JMs. However, the results demonstrated that the Hostile Attribution bias subscale (HAB)
and the Potency bias subscale (PB) were not significantly related to the hard influence
tactics measured in either study. Nevertheless, total readiness to aggress scores (CRT-A)
were significantly related to the hard influence tactics measured in Study 2 (r = .19, p <
.01).
Hypothesis 2: The findings partially support Hypothesis 2, which posited that the
extent to which individuals’ rely on philanthropic justifications mechanisms to rationalize
behavior would be positively related to the extent to which they use soft influence tactics.
Two items had a .20 or greater correlation with the soft influence tactics coded in Study 2
(ST Key 1) and three items had a .20 or greater correlation with the soft influence tactics
coded in Study 3 (ST Key 2). One of these items overlapped across the studies and was
part of ST Key 1 and ST Key 2. ST Key 1 was positively related to the soft influence
tactics in Study 2 (r = .32, p < .01), and Study 3 (r = .20, p < .05). While ST Key 2 was
positively related to the soft influence tactics coded in Study 3 (r = .34, p < .01), it was
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Table 4.6: Comparison of the Distributions of the CR Scales and the Influence Tactics
____
Study 2
Study 3
Variable Skew (st.error) Kurtosis (st. error) Skew (st.error) Kurtosis (st. error)
HT
1.17 (.16)
1.38 (.32)
.72 (.22)
.56 (.43)
ST
1.24 (.16)
2.03 (.32)
.68 (.22)
.37 (.43)
RP
.61 (.16)
.01 (.32)
.36 (.22)
.11 (.43)
MT
1.48 (.16)
2.60 (.32)
.85 (.22)
.59 (.43)
HT Key 1
.78 (.16)
-.30 (.32)
.61 (.22)
-.66 (.43)
HT Key 2
.80 (.16)
.12 (.32)
1.17 (.22)
.93 (.43)
ST Key 1
1.03 (.16)
.08 (.32)
.72 (.22)
-.78 (.43)
ST Key 2
.21 (.16)
-.62 (.32)
.29 (.22)
-.84 (.43)
MT Key 1
.80 (.16)
-.17 (.32)
.72 (.22)
-.16 (.43)
MT Key 2
.87 (.16)
-.22 (.32)
1.70 (.22)
2.94 (.43)
HAB
.71 (.16)
-.07 (.32)
.70 (.22)
.30 (.43)
PB
1.12 (.16)
.95 (.32)
.71 (.22)
-.03 (.43)
CRT-A
.40 (.16)
.01 (.32)
.57 (.22)
.35 (.43)
______________________
Note: n = 235 (Study 2), n = 125 (Study 3); HT = Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft
Influence Tactics; RP = Rational Persuasion; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB
= Hostile Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias.
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not related to the soft influence tactics in Study 2 (r = .02, p >.05). However, both of
these composite scales demonstrated acceptable reliabilities (Study 2: ST Key 1 = .86, ST
Key 2 = .67; Study 3: ST Key 1 = .90, ST Key 2 = .76). Additionally, ST Key 1
demonstrated a significant positive skew, but ST Key 2 did not (see Table 4.6). For a
summary of the items that make up ST Key 1 and ST Key 2 see Table 4.3.
Hypothesis 3: The results failed to support Hypothesis 3. That is, there were no
theoretically appropriate items that correlated .20 or greater with the rational persuasion
influence tactics coded in Study 2 or Study 3.
Hypothesis 4: In partial support of Hypothesis 4, four items had a .20 or greater
correlation with the manipulative influence tactics coded in Study 2 (MT Key 1) and four
items had a .20 or greater correlation with the manipulative influence tactics coded in
Study 3 (MT Key 2). One of these items overlapped across the studies and was part of
MT Key 1 and MT Key 2. MT Key 1 was positively related to the manipulative influence
tactics in Study 2 (r = .43, p < .01), and Study 3 (r = .30, p < .01). Moreover, MT Key 2
was positively related to the manipulative influence tactics coded in Study 3 (r = .42, p <
.01), but not in Study 2. Additionally, both of these composite scales demonstrated
acceptable reliabilities (Study 2: MT Key 1 = .74, MT Key 2 = .76; Study 3: MT Key 1 =
.70, MT Key 2 = .89). The distributions for MT Key 1 and MT Key 2 had a significant
positive skew (see Table 4.6), and MT Key 2 (Study 3) demonstrated a leptokurtotic
distribution. For a summary of items that empirically keyed against the manipulative
influence tactics see Table 4.3.
Moreover, the Hostile Attribution bias subscale of the CRT-A was significantly
related to the manipulative influence tactics measured in Study 2 (r = .19, p < .01) and
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Study 3 (r = .23, p < .01). However, while the CRT-A was significantly related to the
manipulative influence tactics as measured in Study 2 (r = .20, p < .01) and Study 3 (r =
.44, p < .01), the relationship between the Potency bias subscale of the CRT-A and the
manipulative influence tactics was nonsignificant in both studies. For a summary of all
significant validity coefficients between the CR scales and the criteria see Table 4.7.
Supplemental Validity Evidence
Hypotheses 5-12: Table 4.8 summarizes the findings for Hypotheses 5-12. While
the findings failed to support Hypotheses 7, Hypothesis 8, Hypothesis 10, and Hypothesis
12, there was limited support for Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. That is, in Study 2, HT
Key 1 was positively related to male undergraduates’ scores on the NPI (r = .29, p < .01)
and the Mach IV (r = .20, p < .05). Moreover, HT Key 2 was positively related to
female undergraduates’ scores on the NPI (r = .22, p < .05). MT Key 1 was positively
related to male undergraduates’ scores on the NPI (r = .22, p < .05) and MT Key 2 was
positively related female undergraduate’s scores on the Mach IV (r = .19, p < .05).
Furthermore, in Study 3, HT Key 1, HT Key 2, MT Key 1, and PB were positively
related to managers’ scores on the narcissism scale of the CPI (r = .28, p < .01; r = .21,
p < .05; r = .22, p < .05 respectively).
There was also limited support for Hypothesis 9 and Hypothesis 11. In Study 3,
ST Key 2 was positively related to managers’ scores on the responsibility scale of the
CPI (r = .20, p < .05), and HT Key 1 was negatively related to managers’ scores on the
responsibility scale of the CPI (r = -.18, p < .05). See Table 4.9 for correlations among
all Study 2 variables male participants and Table 4.10 for female participants. Also see
Table 4.4 for correlations among all Study 3 variables.
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Table 4.7: Summary of Significant Validity Coefficients for CR Scales.
HT
Study 2
Study 3
.42**
.20*
.23**
.38**

ST
Study 2
Study 3

MT
Study 2
Study 3
.40**
.25**
.24**
.37**
-.31**
-.22*
.43**
.30**
.42**
.19**
.23**

HT Key 1
HT Key 2
ST Key 1
.32**
.20*
ST Key 2
.34**
MT Key 1 .42**
.26**
MT Key 2
.35**
-.18*
HAB
PB
CRT A
.19**
-.28**
.20**
.44**
Note: n = 235 (Study 2), n = 125 (Study 3); HT = Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft
Influence Tactics; RP = Rational Persuasion; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB
= Hostile Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; * = p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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Table 4.8: Summary of Hypotheses 5-12.

Hypothesis
H5: The use of egotistic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
positively related to narcissism (Partially
supported).

Study 2 (males)
HT Key 1 (r = .29**)
MT Key 1 (r = .22*)

H6: The use of egotistic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
positively related to Machiavellianism
(Partially supported).

HT Key 1 (r = .20*)

Significant Findings
Study 2 (females)
HT Key 2 (r = .22*)

Study 3
HT Key 1 (r = .28**)
HT Key 2 (r = .21*)
MT Key 1 (r = .22*)
PB (r = .17*)

MT Key 2 (r = .19*)

H7: The use of philanthropic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
negatively related to narcissism (Not
supported).
H8: The use of philanthropic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
negatively related to Machiavellianism
(Not supported).
Note: n (Study 2 males) = 124; n (Study 2 females) = 111; n (Study 3) = 125; * = p >.05. ** = p > 01.
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Table 4.8: Continued.

Hypothesis
H9: The use of philanthropic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
positively related to responsibility
(Partially supported).

Study 2 (males)

Significant Findings
Study 2 (females)

Study 3
ST Key 2 (r = .20*)

H10: The use of philanthropic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
positively related to emotional maturity
(Not supported).
H11: The use of egotistic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
negatively related to responsibility
(Partially supported).

HT Key 1 (r = -.18*)

H12: The use of egotistic justification
mechanisms to rationalize behavior will be
negatively related to emotional maturity
(Not supported).
Note: n (Study 2 males) = 124; n (Study 2 females) = 111; n (Study 3) = 125; * = p >.05. ** = p > 01.
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Table 4.9: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among all Study 2 Variables for Male Participants.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
m
sd
1. HT Key 1
.94
.97
1.00
2. HT Key 2
.98
.97
.60**
1.00
3. ST Key 1
.48
.59
-.02
-.30** 1.00
1.00
4. ST Key 2
1.31
.88
.08
-.23** .61**
5. MT Key 1
1.12
1.11 .95**
.74**
-.14
.00
1.00
6. MT Key 2
.75
.87
.20*
.89**
-.31** -.28** .43** 1.00
.24**
.17*
.08
.21** .12
1.00
7. HAB
.56
.63
.23**
8. PB
.52
.69
-.01
.06
.15
.11
.05
.00
-.12
1.00
9. CRT A
3.74
1.78 .12
.17*
.05
.03
.14
.14
.55**
.34** 1.00
10. HT
1.15
1.10 .29**
.27**
-.12
-.20*
.29** .11
.20*
-.08
.20* 1.00
11. ST
1.12
1.11 .04
-.01
.42**
.14
.04
-.10
-.19*
.18* .01
.21*
12. RP
4.43
2.59 .18*
.05
.16
.14
.18* -.10
.03
.16
.09
.38**
.23**
-.07
-.08
.36** .11
.29**
.11
.25** .42**
13. MT
.86
.97 .33*
14. NPI
18.26
6.08 .29**
.01
-.15
.01
.22* -.10
-.09
.01
.01
.21*
15. Mach
55.61
6.18 .20*
.02
-.02
.10
.10
.00
.06
.02
.00
.01
16. Re
22.31
4.31 -.15
-.02
.05
.00
-.11
.04
.06
.04
-.18* .12
17. So
29.61
5.62 -.09
.00
.10
-.03
-.07
.01
.11
.00
-.11
.06
Note: n = 124; Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB = Hostile
Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; NPI =
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Mach = Mach IV; Re = CPI Responsibility Scale; So = CPI Socialization scale. * = p >.05.
** = p >.01.
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Table 4.9: Continued.
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1. HT Key 1
2. HT Key 2
3. ST Key 1
4. ST Key 2
5. MT Key 1
6. MT Key 2
7. HAB
8. PB
9. CRT A
10. HT
11. ST
1.00
12. RP
.30** 1.00
1.00
13. MT
.16
.33**
14. NPI
.12
.15
09
1.00
15. Mach
-.06
-.06
.04
.35**
1.00
16. Re
.11
.22*
.24** -.21*
-.31** 1.00
17. So
.04
.07
.08
-.31**
-.31** .52**
1.00
Note: n = 124; Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB = Hostile
Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; NPI =
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Mach = Mach IV; Re = CPI Responsibility Scale; So = CPI Socialization scale. * = p >.05.
** = p >.01.
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Table 4.10: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among all Study 2 variables for Female Participants.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
m
sd
1. HT Key 1
.80
.85
1.00
2. HT Key 2
.80
.77
.42** 1.00
3. ST Key 1
.36
.57
.12
-.02 1.00
4. ST Key 2
1.15
.83
-.06
-.20* .50** 1.00
5. MT Key 1
.91
.90
.98** .55** .05
-.10
1.00
6. MT Key 2
.62
.74
-.06
.86** -.05
-.12
.12
1.00
-19* -.14
.17*
-.06
1.00
7. HAB
.65
.67
.23** -.04
8. PB
.48
.60
.25** -17* -.03
-.06
.20*
-.12
.10
1.00
.07
.08
.21*
.03
.59** .53** 1.00
9. CRT A
3.55
1.81
.26** .02
10. HT
1.20
1.22
.56** .21*
.03
.00
.59**
-.04
.16
.00
.16
1.00
11. ST
1.34
1.27
.14
.08
.23* -.11
.12
-.01
.02
.08
.02
.00
12. RP
4.56
2.25
.33** .20*
.09
-.05
.36**
.07
.11
.01
.11
.42**
-.03
.54**
.16
.15
.06
.15
.58**
13. MT
.80
1.01
.50** .27** -.02
14. NPI
15.75
6.55
.12
.22*
.04
-.05
.11
.12
.07
.02
.11
.18*
15. Mach
52.32
5.85
-.05
.09
.22* -.13
-.02
.19* .01
-.08
-.02
-.11
16. Re
25.60
3.85
.05
.05
-.04
.01
.05
-.10
-.07
.18* .10
.23*
17. So
33.81
5.18
.03
.14
-.10
.04
.06
.05
.19* .11
-.02
.02
Note: n = 111; Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB = Hostile
Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; NPI =
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Mach = Mach IV, Re = CPI Responsibility Scale, So = CPI Socialization scale. * = p >.05.
** = p >.01.
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Table 4.10: Continued.
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1. HT Key 1
2. HT Key 2
3. ST Key 1
4. ST Key 2
5. MT Key 1
6. MT Key 2
7. HAB
8. PB
9. CRT A
10. HT
11. ST
1.00
12. RP
.20*
1.00
1.00
13. MT
.13
.45**
14. NPI
.11
.21*
.26**
1.00
15. Mach
-.02
-.23*
-.05
.21*
1.00
16. Re
.10
.28**
.03
-.17
-.40** 1.00
17. So
-.02
.02
.00
.12
-.23*
.48**
1.00
Note: n = 111; Hard Influence Tactics; ST = Soft Influence Tactics; MT = Manipulative Influence Tactics; HAB = Hostile
Attribution bias; PB = Potency bias; CRT A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; RP = Rational Persuasion; NPI =
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Mach = Mach IV, Re = CPI Responsibility Scale, So = CPI Socialization scale. * = p >.05.
** = p >.01.
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Prediction across Situations
Influence tactics were coded across five separate exercises in Study 3 (a meeting
with a female role player, a meeting with a male role player, a persuasive letter, a group
decision making exercise, and an in-basket exercise). Although no hypotheses were
forwarded concerning the prediction of influence tactics across situations, correlational
analyses were conducted to explore the prediction potential of the composite scales
across the assessment center exercises. The results demonstrated that HT Key 2 was
positively related to the hard influence tactics coded in three out of the five exercises (see
Table 4.11). Similarly, as shown in Table 4.12, MT Key 2 was positively related to the
manipulative influence tactics coded in four of the five exercises. Finally, ST Key 2 was
positively related to the soft influence tactics coded in three out of the five exercises (see
Table 4.13). Thus, there was some initial support for the predictive validity across
manipulative influence tactics coded in four of the five exercises. Finally, ST Key 2 was
positively related to the soft influence tactics coded in three out of the five exercises (see
Table 4.13). Thus, there was some initial support for the predictive validity across
manipulative influence tactics coded in four of the five exercises. Finally, ST Key 2 was
positively related to the soft influence tactics coded in three out of the five exercises (see
Table 4.13). Thus, there was some initial support for the predictive validity across
exercises for the composite scales developed in Study 3.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the composite scales developed in Study 2
(HT Key 1, ST Key 1, and MT Key 1) predict influence tactics coded in group settings.
As discussed in Chapter III, Study 2 consisted only of a group decision making exercise.
The results demonstrated that the composite scales developed for Study 2 were positively
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Table 4.11: Cross Situational Consistency Correlations for Hard Influence Tactics.
Hard Influence Tactics
HT
HT
HT
GDM
IB
Key 1

HT
HT
HT
HT
FRP
MRP
Letter
Key 2 HAB
PB
CRT A
HT FRP
1.00
HT MRP
.19*
1.00
HT Letter
.40**
-0.05
1.00
HT GDM
0.13
-0.05
-0.28
1.00
HT IB
0.03
.49**
-0.09
-0.12
1.00
HT Key 1
0.13
0.08
-0.07
.28**
-0.18 1.00
HT Key 2
0.14
.21*
0.06
.33**
.27** .66**
1.00
HAB
0.12
0.16
-0.09
-0.06
.20*
.19*
0.15
1.00
PB
0.12
0.07
.18*
-0.08
-0.10 0.15
.22*
0.10
1.00
CRT A
0.12
0.04
-0.07
0.04
.17* .27** .41**
.46**
.57**
1.00
Note: n = 125; FRP = influence tactics coded in the meeting with the Female Role Player; MRP = influence tactics coded in
the meeting with the Male Role Player; Letter = influence tactics coded in the persuasive letter; GDM = influence tactics coded
in the Group Decision Making exercise; IB = influence tactics coded in the IN-Basket exercise; HAB = Hostile Attribution
bias; PB = Potency bias * = p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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Table 4.12: Cross Situational Consistency Correlations for Manipulative Influence Tactics.
Manipulative Influence Tactics
MT
MT
MT
Letter
GDM
MT IB
Key 1

MT
MT
MT
FRP
MRP
Key 2 HAB PB
CRT A
MT FRP
1.00
MT MRP
0.11
1.00
MT Letter
.27**
0.03
1.00
MT GDM
-0.09
0.04
-0.04
1.00
MT IB
-0.34
-0.10
0.08
.22*
1.00
MT Key 1
.32**
0.08
.30**
.22*
-.23**
1.00
MT Key 2
.17*
0.21*
.33**
.31**
0.12
.58**
1.00
HAB
0.16
0.12
.29**
0.07
0.02
.23**
0.14
1.00
PB
.17*
-0.08
0.09
.17*
0.04
0.16
0.22*
0.10
1.00
CRT A
.21*
0.09
.35**
.32**
.19*
.34**
.41** .46** .57**
1.00
Note: n = 125; FRP = influence tactics coded in the meeting with the Female Role Player; MRP = influence tactics coded in
the meeting with the Male Role Player; Letter = influence tactics coded in the persuasive letter; GDM = influence tactics coded
in the Group Decision Making exercise; IB = influence tactics coded in the In-Basket exercise; HAB = Hostile Attribution
bias, PB = Potency bias * = p >.05. ** = p >.01.
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Table 4.13: Cross Situational Consistency Correlations for Soft Influence Tactics.
Soft Influence Tactics
ST
ST
ST MRP
Letter
GDM

ST
ST
ST
ST
FRP
IB
Key 1 Key 2
ST FRP
1.00
ST MRP
.26**
1.00
ST Letter
-.15
-.09
1.00
ST GDM
.04
-.07
-.23*
1.00
ST IB
.18*
.27**
.06
.21*
1.00
ST Key 1
.10
.09
-.08
.28**
.10
1.00
ST Key 2
.26**
.25**
-.47**
.25**
.02
.67**
1.00
Note: n = 125; FRP = influence tactics coded in the meeting with the Female Role Player;
MRP = influence tactics coded in the meeting with the Male Role Player; Letter =
influence tactics coded in the persuasive letter; GDM = influence tactics coded in the
Group Decision Making exercise; IB = influence tactics coded in the In-Basket exercise;
* = p >.05. ** = p >.01.

related to the influence tactics coded in the group decision making exercise of Study 3.
That is, in Study 3, HT Key 1 was positively related to the hard influence tactics coded in
the group decision making exercise (r = .28, p < .01). Additionally, ST Key 1 was
positively related to the soft influence tactics coded in the group exercise (r = .28, p <
.01), and MT Key 1 was positively related to the manipulative influence tactics coded in
the group exercise (r = .22, p < .05). Therefore, these composite scales appear to have
some validity for predicting influence tactics coded in group settings.
Post-hoc Analyses
Given that the CRT-A demonstrated moderate predictive validity with the
manipulative influence tactics measured in Study 2, multiple regression analyses were
conducted to determine if the new CR items written explicitly to measure egotistic
leadership and empirically keyed against the criteria added predictive validity above and
beyond the CRT-A. The results demonstrated that each predictor significantly contribute
83

to the R2 for the full model equal to .20 (see Table 4.14). A dominance analysis (Budescu,
1993) was also performed to determine the relative contribution of each variable to
prediction. In predicting the influence tactics, the new CR items contributed the largest
proportion at 87.5%, while the CRT-A contributed 12.5% (see Table 4.15).
In addition to running the regression and dominance analyses with Study 2
variables, multiple regression and dominance analyses were conducted to determine if the
new CR items that empirically keyed against Study 3 manipulative influence tactics
added predictive validity above and beyond the CRT-A and CPI-narcissism measures.
The results demonstrated that each predictor significantly contributed to the R2 for the full
model equal to .32 (see Table 4.16). Furthermore, in predicting the manipulative
influence tactics, the CRT-A contributed the largest proportion at 42.71%, with the new
CR items next at 36.46%, and then the CPI-narcissism with 20.83% (see Table 4.17).
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Table 4.14: Regression Analyses for Study 2 Manipulative Influence Tactics.
Change Statistics
Std. Error of
Sig. F
Model
R
R2
the Estimate
R2 Change
F Change
Change
1
.20
.04
.97
.04
9.71
.002
2
.45
.20
.89
.16
46.55
.000
Note: Dependent variable: Manipulative Influence Tactics; Model 1: CRT-A; Model 2:
CRT-A and MT Key 1.
Table 4.15: Dominance Analysis for Study 2 Manipulative Influence Tactics.
Measure

Zero Order R

CRT-A

.20**

MT Key 1

.43**

Beta Weight

General
Importance

Relative
Importance

.13*

.03

12.50%

.41**

.18

87.50%

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01. General Importance is the amount of the total R2 accounted
for by the variable; Relative Importance is the % of R2 accounted for by that variable.

Table 4.16: Regression Analyses for Study 3 Manipulative Influence Tactics.
Change Statistics
Std. Error of
Sig. F
2
Model
R
R
the Estimate
R Change
F Change
Change
1
.440
.19
.92
.19
29.53
.000
2
.512
.26
.88
.07
11.42
.001
3
.564
.32
.85
.06
9.82
.002
Note: Dependent variable: Manipulative Influence Tactics; Model 1: CRT-A; Model 2:
CRT-A and MT Key 2; Model 3: CRT-A, MT Key 2, and CPI-Narcissism.
2
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Table 4.17: Dominance Analysis for Study 3 Manipulative Influence Tactics.
Measure

Zero Order R

Beta Weight

CRT-A

.44**

.32**

MT Key 2

.42**

.26**

.29**

.24**

CPI-Narcissism

General
Importance

Relative
Importance

.137

42.71%

.117

36.46%

.067

20.83%

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01. General Importance is the amount of the total R2 accounted
for by the variable; Relative Importance is the % of R2 accounted for by that variable.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The current study took a cognitive approach to explaining self-serving and
collective-serving leadership behaviors. More specifically, this study extended prior
research by a) identifying the important implicit cognitions (i.e., justification
mechanisms) that underlie egotistic and philanthropic leadership behaviors, b) initiating
the development of a measure based on the conditional reasoning methodology to assess
individuals’ proclivities to rely on the identified justification mechanisms, and c) testing
the validity of the conditional reasoning methodology for predicting egotistic and
philanthropic influence tactics. To date, the author is unaware of any study exploring the
implicit cognitions of egotistic and philanthropic leaders nor of any study assessing the
validity of a measure designed specifically to predict these types of leaders.
Study 1
As proposed, the results of this study suggest that implicit cognitions play an
important role in explaining why individuals engage in egotistic leadership behaviors or
philanthropic leadership behaviors. In particular, the findings from Study 1 demonstrated
that egotistic and philanthropic leaders rely on different implicit biases to enhance the
rational appeal of their contrasting behaviors. That is, the six egotistic justification
mechanisms (i.e., Potency bias, Hostile Attribution bias, Others as Objects bias,
Superiority bias, Meritocracy bias, and Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias) identified
in Chapter II seemed to accurately reflect the major implicit biases manifested in the selfserving business leaders’ statements. Furthermore, the three philanthropic justification
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mechanisms (i.e., Social Contract bias, Efficacious Others bias, and Stewardship bias)
identified in this paper seemed to accurately reflect the major implicit biases manifested
in the collective-serving business leaders’ statements. Thus, these two groups of leaders
appeared to reason very differently from one another, and in turn, reach very different
conclusions concerning what is and what is not acceptable leadership behavior. For
example, the two statements that follow reflect the opposing viewpoints made by an
egotistic leader and a philanthropic leader concerning downsizing:
Some think it’s cruel or brutal to remove the bottom 10 percent of our
people. It isn’t. It’s just the opposite. What I think is brutal and ‘false
kindness’ is keeping people around who aren’t going to grow and prosper.
There’s no cruelty like waiting and telling people late in their careers that
they don’t belong (Egotistic leader’s statement; Welch, 2001 p.161-162).
I did five layoffs totaling 5,000 people. It nearly killed me. I vowed never
to do that again to employees or shareholders…I learned a long time ago
that in team sports or in business, a group working together can always
defeat a team of individuals. Even if the individuals, by themselves, are
each better than your team…(Philanthropic leader’s statement; O’Reilly &
Pfeffer, 2000).
To the egotistic leader, firing thousands of people seems like a rational and even
honorable behavior, yet to the philanthropic leader this behavior seems irrational and
almost inhumane. These differing view points concerning downsizing appear to stem
from the differing justification mechanisms (JMs) that shape framing proclivities. For the
leader who relies on egotistic JMs, others are objects who should be discarded if they do
not belong or offer no use to the leader. Conversely, for the leader who relies on
philanthropic JMs, others are humans with great potential and humans working together
are powerful entities that become less powerful with the loss of anyone individual.
All in all, the results of Study 1 suggest that self-serving leaders strive to win at
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all costs and see themselves as superior, nonfallible beings entitled to all that the world
has to offer. Moreover, they tend to frame others as tools whom they can control and
manipulate to serve their own self-interests. They use their perceptions that they are
superior and others are inferior objects to justify abusing power. In contrast, the results
suggest that collective-serving leaders view themselves as stewards who are responsible
for serving individual and collective interests and protecting the intrinsic worth and
dignity of all individuals. Additionally, they tend to frame others as origins of their own
behavior who need to be guided and inspired to achieve collective goals. Philanthropic
leaders do not think of forgoing their own interests to serve collective interests as
irrational; rather, they view such actions as the justifiable behaviors of servants who are
seeking to protect fundamental human rights and maximize human potential.
These results provide qualitative support for the proposed relationship between an
uninhibited power motive and self-serving leadership. Specifically, in Chapter II it was
proposed that the egotistic JMs stem from an uninhibited power motive. Thus, many of
the egotistic JMs identified in this paper were based on theoretical discussions of
personalized power or an uninhibited power motive. For example, McClelland (1970;
1975) proposed that individuals with personalized power tend to behave as if life is a
Zero-Sum game: If I win, you lose. This zero-sum belief is quite similar to the Potency
bias that James and Mazerolle (2002) identified as a key JM underlying the
rationalization of aggressive behaviors. Hence, the Potency bias was identified as a key
JM underlying egotistic leadership behaviors. The results of Study 1 which found that the
SMEs identified the Potency bias in 13 of the self-serving leaders’ statements, offer some
support for McClelland’s (1970; 1975) assertion that framing life as a Zero-sum game is
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an important characteristic of individuals with an uninhibited power motive. Given that
many of the identified egotistic JMs were derived from writings devoted to the
uninhibited power motive, the findings from Study 1 lend support for the proposed
relationship between an uninhibited power motive and self-serving leadership.
The results from Study 1 also support the proposed relationship between
narcissism and self-serving leadership. Like an uninhibited power motive, many of the
egotistic JMs were based on research regarding narcissism. According to numerous
researchers, narcissism is assumed to be a major personality antecedent of egotistic
leadership (e.g., Conger, 1990; Conger & Kanungo, 1998; House & Howell, 1992;
Hogan, et. al, 1990; O’Connor, et. al, 1995). In particular, two major facets of narcissism
(superiority and entitlement) have frequently been linked to egotistic leadership (House
& Howell, 1992; Hogan et. al, 1990). In this paper, superiority and entitlement beliefs
provided the framework for the Superiority bias and the Meritocracy bias. According to
the SMEs these JMs were reflected in the self-serving leaders’ statements. Thus, these
results offer some qualitative support for the relationship between several dimensions of
narcissism and egotistic leadership.
Furthermore, the results concerning the collective-serving leaders from Study 1
lend support for the proposed relationship between an inhibited power motive and
collective-serving leadership. Previously, it was proposed that philanthropic JMs stem
from an inhibited or socialized power motive. Accordingly, the philanthropic JMs were
derived in part from research on socialized power. For instance, the Efficacious Others
bias was based on McClelland’s (1975) assertion that individuals with a socialized power
orientation tend to view others as origins rather than pawns. The results of Study 1 found
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that the SMEs identified the Efficacious Others bias in 14 of the collective-serving
leaders’ statements, therefore offering some support for McClelland’s (1975) claim that
framing others as origins of behavior as opposed to pawns is an important characteristic
of individuals with an inhibited power orientation.
Finally, the results from Study 1 provided support for the assumption that
philanthropic leaders have high moral reasoning. In particular, the findings demonstrated
that the Social Contract bias is an important JM reflected in collective-leaders’
statements. The Social Contract bias was rooted in Kohlberg’s (1969; 1976)
postconventional stage of moral reasoning. According to Colby and Kohlberg (1987)
postconventionalists tend to frame society as a contract based on social cooperation and
agreement, and they believe that that all humans warrant respect in their own right as
individuals having intrinsic worth and dignity. This line of reasoning was evident in the
collective-serving leaders’ statements.
In sum, the results of Study 1 found that all of the JMs identified in Chapter II
were evident in the self-serving and collective-serving leaders’ statements. These
findings make a significant contribution to the literature because they provide some initial
evidence that implicit biases are important to the study of egotistic and philanthropic
leadership. Furthermore, these results suggest that egotistic leaders engage in selfserving leadership behaviors because they frame such behaviors as rational, and
philanthropic leaders engage in collective-serving leadership behaviors because they
frame these behaviors as rational. Additionally, the findings suggested that an uninhibited
power motive and narcissism play an important role in self-serving leadership as these
personality constructs formed the basis for the egotistic JMs. Similarly, the results
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suggested an inhibited power motive and high moral reasoning play a key role in
collective-serving leadership as these personality variables formed the basis for the
philanthropic JMs. Such findings are important because they add to the limited empirical
support that has been published regarding these relationships despite the considerable
theoretical focus that they have received.
Study 2 & Study 3
Not only do the identified JMs have explanatory power, but the initial evidence
from Study 2 and Study 3 suggest that most of the JMs have predictive power with
regards to self-serving and collective-serving influence tactics. More specifically,
although the conditional reasoning measure designed to predict these two forms of
leadership is in its initial stage of development, the preliminary validity results were
promising for the items based on the JMs. That is, HT Key 1 and HT Key 2 were
positively related to the hard influence tactics coded in both Study 2 and Study 3.
Furthermore, these composite scales were both positively related to the manipulative
influence tactics that were coded in Studies 2 and 3. While MT Key 2 was not related to
the manipulative and hard influence tactics measured in Study 2, MT Key 1 was related
to both criteria as measured in Study 2. Additionally, MT Key 1 and MT Key 2 were
positively related to the manipulative influence tactics and the hard influence tactics
coded in Study 3. Moreover, the HAB subscale of the CRT-A was positively related the
manipulative influence tactics measured in both studies.
At least one item based on the Meritocracy bias, Infinitely Manipulatable
Universe bias, and the Others as Objects bias empirically keyed against one or both of the
criteria. Additionally, the HAB subscale was related to manipulative influence tactics;
92

however, the Potency bias subscale was not significantly related to either the hard or
manipulative influence tactics measured in Study 2 and Study 3. Similarly, there were no
items based on the Superiority bias that were significantly related to either the hard or
manipulative influence tactics measured in Study 2 and Study 3. Thus, while these two
JMs were identified in the self-serving leaders’ statements in Study 1, they did not
demonstrate predictive validity in Study 2 and Study 3. Nevertheless, the findings
provide some preliminary support suggesting that many of the egotistic JMs identified in
this paper are reliable predictors of self-serving (i.e., hard and manipulative) influence
tactics.
In addition to the results found for the egotistic JMs, the results demonstrated
somewhat promising validity evidence for the items based on the philanthropic JMs.
Specifically, ST Key 1 and ST Key 2 were positively related to the soft influence tactics
coded in Study 3. Furthermore, ST Key 1 was positively related to the soft influence
tactics coded in Study 2. However, the relationship between ST Key 2 and the soft
influence tactics coded in Study 2 was nonsignificant. Of the philanthropic items that
correlated .20 or greater with the soft influence tactics coded in one or both studies, all of
them appeared to reflect the Social Contract Bias. Accordingly, while all three JMs were
identified in the collective-serving leaders’ statements in Study 1, only one JM (i.e., the
Social Contract Bias) demonstrated predictive validity in Study 2 and Study 3.
Nevertheless the results demonstrated predictive and cross-validities for the composite
philanthropic scales and the soft influence tactics
Conversely, there were no items based on the philanthropic JMs that had a .20
correlation or greater with the rational persuasion influence tactics coded in either study.
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One possible reason for the lack of significant findings in Study 3 was that the rational
persuasion influence tactics were normally distributed, but the philanthropic items were
designed to predict highly skewed criteria. Accordingly, nine of the thirteen philanthropic
items were significantly, positively skewed. Thus, one explanation for the lack of
significant findings between the philanthropic items and the rational persuasion influence
tactics were the differences observed in the marginal distributions. In other words, it
appears that most of the managers in Study 3 engaged in rationale persuasion influence
tactics to some extent, but only a few of the managers selected the philanthropic JM
responses.
While the rationale persuasion influence tactics were normally distributed in the
managerial sample, they were positively skewed in the undergraduate sample. However,
as previously noted none of the philanthropic items empirically keyed against the rational
persuasion influence tactics. In actuality, the rational persuasion influence tactics were
positively related to the egotistic composite scales in Study 2. More specifically, these
influence tactics were positively related to HT Key 1 and MT Key 1 in Study 2 for the
undergraduate participants. Hence, the undergraduate participants who scored high on
these composite scales were likely to engage in rational persuasion influence tactics as
well as hard and manipulative influence tactics. This finding may be due to the nature of
the group task. That is, each group was trying to come up with the best solution to beat
out all other groups and win the bid. This environment of competition between groups
may have created an atmosphere of cooperation within groups. Specifically, in an effort
to win as group, perhaps the egotistic individuals were willing to provide solid rationale
for their recommendations in addition to their use of hard and manipulative influence
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tactics. Future research should investigate the use of rational persuasion influence tactics
in between group competition situations and within group competition situations.
Despite the lack of findings between the philanthropic items and the rational
persuasion influence tactics, the initial predictive validities for the composite scales were
promising. In addition to providing preliminary predictive validity evidence for the
conditional reasoning items, supplemental validity evidence was sought. In particular, it
was hypothesized that there would be a modest relationship between the conditional
reasoning scales and the explicit personality measures (NPI, Mach IV, CPI-Socialization,
CPI-Responsibility, CPI-Narcissism). However, the results demonstrated many near zero
correlations between the conditional reasoning composite scales (i.e., HT Key 1, HT Key
2, MT Key 1, MT Key 2, HAB, and PB) and the explicit personality measures.
Specifically, the only modest correlations that were observed between multiple
conditional reasoning composite scales and the explicit personality measures were
between the Hard and Manipulative Influence Tactics composite scales and measures of
narcissism as well as the PB subscale and the CPI-narcissism. While it was hypothesized
that there would be modest correlations between the conditional reasoning scales and the
explicit personality measures, the near zero correlations were not unexpected.
Previous research on implicit personality measures, like the CRT-A, have shown
near zero to moderate correlations with explicit personality measures (cf. Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; James, 1998; Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2002; McClelland et al., 1989;
Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). The near zero correlations are not
unexpected because the types of implicit cognitions being measured by conditional
reasoning do not necessarily overlap with the types of explicit cognitions or personality
95

traits being measured by self-report scales (James & Mazerolle, 2002). As noted in
Chapter II, self-report inventories are not capable of measuring unconscious facets of
personality. While individuals are able to reflect on and respond to self-report items about
their behavioral tendencies, intentions, and reasons for action based on their conscious
perceptions (McClelland et al., 1989), they are not able to accurately report about their
unconscious motives and biases. James and Mazerolle (2002) noted that self-report
measures tend to be most effective in predicting short-term changes in behavior that
result from extensive cost-benefit analyses, but they tend to be less effective in predicting
long-term behavioral trends or reactions to novel/evocative stimuli. Thus, while the
measures used in this study appear to be tapping into the same or similar personality
constructs, they are actually quite different given that the conditional reasoning measure
was designed to assess implicit facets of personality and the self-report measures were
designed to assess explicit facets of personality. On the whole, these measures may
complement one another, but as James et al., (2005, p.93) stated, “there is no simple
pattern to how these explicit and implicit components relate”. Accordingly, the
nonsignificant correlations do not suggest a lack of construct validity.
An additional explanation for the lack of significant findings between the selfreport personality measures and the CR composite scales is the differences in
distributions. The self-report measures used in Study 2 and Study 3 had normal
distributions while most of the composite scales and all of the criteria (except for the
rational persuasion influence tactics measured in Study 3) were positively skewed. Given
the dissimilar distributions, the near zero to moderate correlations between the self-report
measures and implicit CR measures were not surprising.
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Similarly, the relationships between the self-report measures and the influence
tactics demonstrated near zero to moderate correlations. These results suggest that selfreport measures were somewhat limited in their ability to predict egotistic and
philanthropic influence tactics. However, these findings do not mean that the personality
constructs discussed throughout this paper are irrelevant in understanding egotistic and
philanthropic leadership. More specifically, both narcissism and high moral reasoning
were important in identifying the JMs highlighted in Chapter II. As noted earlier in this
chapter, the Meritocracy bias was primarily based on narcissism research, and many of
the items measuring this implicit bias empirically keyed against the self-serving influence
tactics. Thus, the implicit facets of these personality constructs are important to
understanding egotistic and philanthropic leadership, and predicting egotistic and
philanthropic influence tactics.
Additionally, the explicit facets of narcissism appear to be somewhat important to
understanding and predicting self-serving influence tactics. In particular, the explicit
facets of narcissism were moderately related to the extent to which undergraduates (Study
2) engaged in hard influence tactics, and the extent to which managers (Study 3) and
female undergraduates (Study 2) engaged in manipulative influence tactics. Furthermore,
the CPI-Narcissism measure added predictive validity beyond the CR items and the CRTA in predicting the manipulative influence tactics measured in Study 3. Thus, in the case
of this personality construct, individuals who, at both a conscious and unconscious level
believe they are superior beings entitled to all the world has to offer them, are likely to
engage in self-serving influence tactics.
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In addition to these findings, an another interesting finding from Study 2 and
Study 3 was the presence of gender differences in the undergraduates’ scores on the
explicit personality measures, but the lack of gender differences in the managers’ scores.
That is, the female managers in the Study 3 scored similarly to the male managers on the
explicit personality measures. This finding supports previous gender research with
managers. Specifically, research on managers suggests that managerial roles are typically
aligned with stereotypical male characteristics such as assertiveness, confidence, and
competitiveness (Schein, 1975, Schein & Mueller, 1992). Hence, the few females that
tend to occupy higher-level managerial roles tend to be more masculine (Kawakami,
White, & Langer, 2000).
Limitations
While the initial validity results were somewhat promising for the conditional
reasoning measure, there are some limitations to the three studies. First, with regards to
statements rated by the SMEs in Study 1, these statements were selected by the author of
this study from autobiographies and interviews of egotistic and philanthropic leaders. The
author intended to record statements that expressed extreme viewpoints about the world
and seemingly atypical accounts for behavior. However, the author was fairly familiar
with the JMs identified for aggressive individuals (James & Mazarolle, 2002); thus, the
author may have been primed to seek out these statements in the egotistic leaders’
statements as many of the statements identified by the SMEs were classified as one of the
three Aggressive JMs highlighted in this study (i.e., Hostile Attribution Bias, Potency
Bias, and Derogation of the Target/Others as Objects Bias).

98

Additionally, a major limitation of Study 2 and Study 3 was the criteria.
Specifically, while four categories of influence tactics were coded in these studies,
influence tactics as a general class of behavior was the sole indicator of egotistic and
philanthropic leadership. As noted in Chapter II (see Table 2.1) there are many
classifications of egotistic and philanthropic leadership behaviors that were not assessed
in Study 2 or Study 3. For example, management styles (e.g., authoritative versus
democratic) and communication styles (one-way versus two-way) were not examined in
this study. Therefore, future studies should be undertaken to determine if the conditional
reasoning composite scales developed in this study predict other egotistic and
philanthropic leadership behaviors. Nevertheless, influence tactics are arguably the
quintessential leadership behaviors (Yukl, 2002).
Another limitation with the criteria was that the egotistic criteria served as
surrogates of unethical behavior. That is, while hard and manipulative influence tactics
are frequently engaged in by unethical leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Howell &
Avolio, 1992; Wright & Smye, 1996; Yukl, 2002), they are not necessarily unethical
behaviors by themselves. Unethical behaviors involve the intent to deceive (Seabright &
Moberg, 1998); although the manipulative influence tactics captured deception, intent of
the individual was not assessed. Thus, while it is likely that the participants who
frequently engaged in the manipulative influence tactics intended to deceive others, this
can not be said for sure. For any study, measuring the intent of someone who engages in
manipulative behaviors seems to be a limitation. In order to measure one’s true
intentions, the researcher assumes that a) the unethical individual is consciously aware
that he or she intended to deceive others and b) the unethical individual will honestly
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self-report his or her own intentions. Arguably, it is unlikely that an individual who
knowingly deceives others will honestly report that he or she intended to engage in
unethical behaviors. One possible way to address this limitation would be to identify
white collar criminals who have been caught engaging in unethical behaviors (e.g.,
embezzlement, fraud, and tax evasion) and admitted their intentions in court. Ideally,
future research on egotistic leadership should investigate the implicit biases and other
personality characteristics of white collar criminals.
A third limitation of Study 2 and Study 3 was that the participants were aware that
their behaviors were being recorded; thus, they may have been more apt to engage in
socially acceptable behaviors (e.g., soft influence tactics and rational persuasion) and less
apt to engage in socially unacceptable behaviors (e.g., manipulative influence tactics).
Additionally, while care was taken that the participants engaged in realistic work sample
exercises, the exercises took place in “laboratory settings” with other individuals the
participants did not know very well. Thus, the participants may have acted differently
during the exercises than they normally would in their natural work environment.
However, despite these limitations, self-serving influence tactics were observed in this
study. Nevertheless, it is probable that the participants who engaged in self-serving
influence tactics in the observed “laboratory” settings would engage in even more selfserving influence tactics in their natural work environment where more is at stake. Thus,
the validity coefficients observed in Study 2 and Study 3 may actually be underestimates
of the true relationship between egotistic JMs and self-serving leadership behaviors.
Moreover, a limitation with Study 2 was the loss of data due to nearly ten percent
of the original participants selecting illogical CR responses. As a likely result of this data
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loss, the mean and standard deviation for the CRT-A were somewhat lower than typically
found with similar samples (James, et, al., 2005). That is, it is reasonable to assume that
many of the participants who provided multiple illogical responses were behaving
passive aggressively and probably would have scored higher than the norm on the CRTA. Accordingly, the validity coefficients observed in Study 2 may be underestimates of
the true relationship between the CRT-A and self-serving leadership behaviors.
Finally, another limitation that may have lead to underestimated validity
coefficients in Study 3 was that the criteria for this study were coded from assessment
center rating sheets. Accordingly, the behaviors described on the rating sheets were those
behaviors that the assessors thought were critical incidents of performance. Thus, they
may not have viewed some influence tactics like creating coalitions or bargaining as
critical incidents. Furthermore, assessor experience may have also affected the behaviors
deemed “critical” and recorded on rating sheets. For example, a less experienced assessor
may not be as apt as an experienced assessor to recognize a participant’s exaggerated
claims, as the less experienced assessor may be somewhat unfamiliar with the intricate
details of the exercise materials. Thus, if a behavior was not on an assessor’s assessment
center rating sheet, the behavior was not there for the coder to capture. As a result, a
participant may have engaged in more self-serving or collective-serving influence tactics
than was actually captured on the rating sheet. Therefore, the validity coefficients
between the conditional reasoning measures and the criteria may have been
underestimates of the relationships.
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Future Research
Given that this study represents the first attempt to identify egotistic and
philanthropic leaders with the conditional reasoning methodology and it is one of the few
empirical studies examining the relationship between these types of leadership and
personality variables, there remain a number of other research avenues to pursue.
Throughout the course of this chapter several areas for future research have already been
discussed. In particular, it was noted that the impact that group competition has on
egotistic leaders’ tendencies to engage in categories of influence tactics should be further
investigated. Additionally, it was stated that future research should attempt to investigate
the implicit biases of white collar criminals.
Furthermore, much research is still needed on the development and validation of
new CR items designed to assess egotistic and philanthropic JMs. Currently there were
only a handful of CR items (eleven items including CRT-A items) that empirically keyed
against the self-serving leadership criteria, and even fewer CR items (three items) that
empirically keyed against the collective-serving leadership criteria. Along this line, future
research should focus on identifying additional philanthropic JMs. While six egotistic
JMs were identified in this paper, only three philanthropic JMs were identified.
Moreover, only one of the philanthropic JMs demonstrated predictive validity (i.e., the
Social Contract bias) with the soft influence tactics. One reason so few philanthropic JMs
were identified in this study was that at the time the author was reviewing the literature
on these types of leaders, the literature provided limited insight into their implicit biases.
However, within the past few years numerous papers have been written on the topic of
Authentic Leadership (Avolio & Gardner, 2005) which appears to be analogous to
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philanthropic leadership. Authentic leaders are described as leaders who are self-aware,
have high moral reasoning, and engage in authentic self-regulation that includes unbiased
interpretation of self related information (Gardner, Avolio, Luthans, May, & Walumbwa,
2005). These leaders act in accordance to their true selves and display high levels of
openness, self-disclosure, and trust in others (Gardner et al., 2005). The literature on
Authentic Leadership may provide additional insights into other philanthropic JMs not
identified in this study. For instance, Avolio and Gardner (2005) noted that these leaders
are optimistic and very hopeful. Thus, perhaps there is an optimism bias at play. That is,
these leaders tend to frame events in positive manners and see the world in terms of hope
instead of despair. Clearly, more work and refinement is needed on the suggested
optimism bias, but it provides a jumping point for future avenues to pursue.
Another area for future research is to continue to explore the relationship between
the CRT-A, implicit measures of narcissism, and self-serving leadership. More
specifically, Hogan and his colleagues (1990) maintained that there are three types of
flawed leaders: the highly likeable leader, the paranoid and passive-aggressive leader,
and the narcissistic leader. Throughout this paper, it has been assumed that the passiveaggressive leader and the narcissistic leader are one in the same falling under the label of
egotistic leader. In reading interviews and autobiographies of self-serving leaders, many
leaders’ statements reflected both the aggression-related JMs (i.e., Hostile Attribution
bais, Potency bias, and Derogation of the Target bias) and narcissistic-related JMs (i.e.,
Superiority bias, Meritocracy bias, and Infinitely Manipulatable Universe bias). Thus, it
seemed reasonable that the egotistic leader would rely on both aggression-related JMs
and narcissistic-related JMs. However, the empirical results demonstrated only a
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moderate relationship between the CRT-A and the composite scales measuring the
narcissistic-related JMs. Furthermore, the composite scales did a better job of predicting
hard influence tactics than the CRT-A and the HAB and PB subscales. Additionally, both
the CRT-A and the composite scales each significantly contributed to the prediction of
the manipulative influence tactics. Given these findings, it appears that the aggressive
leader is different from the narcissistic leader as proposed by Hogan and his colleagues
(1990). Future research needs to examine the relationship between these two personality
constructs and leadership styles.
Further research also needs to examine the outcomes of the interaction between
egotistic leadership and transformational leadership. As noted in Chapter II, egotistic
leaders who engage in charismatic or transformational leadership are particularly
dangerous because they are capable of manipulating followers to go beyond their selfinterests and emotionally engage in pursuits of evil ends contrary to the followers’ best
interests (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Stevens, D’Intino, & Victor, 1995; White &
Wooten, 1986). Despite the potential danger these leaders pose to society, there are
currently no empirical studies that have tested the interaction between self-serving and
transformational leadership and resulting outcomes. Like most of the literature regarding
philanthropic leaders, the literature on self-serving transformational leaders has been
based primarily on anecdotal evidence. However, as these are the leaders that seem most
damning to society, it seems particularly important that research empirically investigate
the interaction between egotistic leadership and transformational leadership.
Finally, most of the research on egotistic and philanthropic leadership has
proposed that personality is key to predicting these two forms of leadership. Thus, few
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researchers have discussed the possible role that situational factors play in egotistic and
philanthropic leadership. In reading the autobiographies and interviews of unethical and
highly ethical leaders, the author of this study noted a trend in the highly ethical leaders’
statements. Specifically, many of these leaders worked for private organizations and did
everything in their power to keep their organizations private. These authors argued that
going public opened the door for unethical leadership practices because public
organizations are evaluated primarily in terms of quarterly earnings; thus, leaders of these
organizations are overly concerned about short-term gains and keeping labor costs down
without consideration of long-term implications. While personality, especially implicit
personality, is still believed to be a key determinant of egotistic and philanthropic
leadership, the role of situational variables should be examined in future studies.
Conclusion
This study represents a first attempt to develop and validate a measure designed to
predict individuals likely to engage in egotistic leadership behaviors and individuals
likely to engage in philanthropic leadership behaviors. Although the measure still has a
long way to go before it is considered validated, the results were promising for the
conditional reasoning methodology. That is, both the CRT-A and several new CR items
developed for this study predicted the criteria of interest better than the explicit
personality measures used in this study. Furthermore, the results of this study suggest
that the participants who engaged in self-serving influence tactics relied on a different
subset of JMs than the participants who engaged in collective-serving influence tactics.
Together these findings suggest that the key to understanding self-serving and collective-
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serving leaders lies in their implicit cognitions, and the key to predicting these types of
leaders lies in our ability to measure their implicit biases.
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